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In many markets, competing firms can maximize their profits 
by colluding to reduce output and increase price. Fortunately, several 
impediments exist to successful cartelization, some practical and 
others legal. Practical impediments include the difficulties in getting 
rival firms to agree to particular price and output limits and to abide 
by their agreements. 
Antitrust law represents the primary legal obstacle to price 
fixing, which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act.1 Firms 
that engage in price fixing may try to reduce their probability of 
antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a price-
fixing conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities 
from antitrust enforcers. Second, because Section One condemns only 
concerted action, firms may attempt to structure their relationship to 
appear to be the action of a unified single entity that is beyond the 
reach of Section One. 
Much of the argument for treating an organization such as the 
National Football League (―NFL‖) as a single entity—which is legally 
incapable of collusion under Section One of the Sherman Act—
confuses the entity question, which is essentially structural, with the 
cooperation question, which is functional or behavioral. Many markets 
require firms to cooperate in the delivery of their product, in some 
cases a great deal. This is true of blanket licensing of recorded music,2 
multiple listing services operated by real estate agencies,3 and 
standard setting by firms in high tech industries,4 and sports leagues. 
But cooperation does not mean these firms are single entities; the 
need for cooperation, or even for interconnectivity, requires 
application of antitrust‘s more deferential rule of reason.5 It does not 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 2. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15–24 (1979) (applying the 
rule of reason). 
 3. Freeman v. San Diego Ass‘n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1152–54 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding it per se unlawful to use the multi-list process to fix commission rates). 
 4. Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270–73 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2055 (2009) (holding that standard setting by cellular telephone companies did 
not equate to a restraint of trade). 
 5. In contrast to the per se rule, pursuant to which restraints that fall in a per se category 
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 
U.S. 332, 344 (1982), in rule-of-reason cases ―the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a 
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.‖ Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
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require single entity treatment, however, which effectively immunizes 
the conduct from output reductions and price increases altogether.6 
The Supreme Court‘s Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 
decision, which held that a parent and wholly owned subsidiary were 
a single entity, grew out of a milieu in which agreements between 
independent actors were often subjected to unreasonably harsh 
treatment under antitrust‘s per se rule.7 For example, in the Photovest 
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp. decision, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary could be guilty of a per se 
unlawful conspiracy directed at the plaintiff, one of the defendant‘s 
independent franchisees.8 In such a milieu, in which even purely 
vertical conduct was treated very critically, broad single entity 
findings made some sense. Today, however, courts are much less likely 
to apply the per se rule to anything except naked horizontal conduct. 
Joint ventures and purely vertical arrangements are instead 
evaluated under the rule of reason, where power and actual 
anticompetitive effects must be proven.9 
In American Needle, the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
the NFL was a ―combination‖ of its individual teams rather than a 
single actor for purposes of an antitrust challenge to a single exclusive 
licensing arrangement covering all of the teams‘ individual trademark 
rights.10 The Supreme Court‘s decision cut through formalities of 
business organization to get directly to the question that is important 
for antitrust: When is an organization of biological persons, 
institutions, or other economic actors a single antitrust ―person‖ and 
 
Under the rule of reason, courts take ―into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the restraint‘s history, nature, and effect.‖ State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 
(1997). 
 6. See discussion infra notes 57, 220 and accompanying text.  
 7. 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 8. 606 F.2d 704, 725–27 (7th Cir. 1979); cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int‘l Parts Corp., 
392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding that parent and wholly owned subsidiaries could conspire to impose 
per se unlawful ties on dealers); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 
211 (1951) (holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent could unlawfully 
conspire to impose resale price maintenance on their dealers). 
 9. E.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 132 (1998) (holding that a purely 
vertical agreement should be evaluated using the rule of reason); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984) (using the rule of reason to analyze a horizontal price 
fixing and output limitation where the industry at issue requires horizontal restraints on 
competition in order to make their product available). 
 10. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010). 
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when is it a combination? Under the Sherman Act, a ―person‖11 acting 
alone commits a violation only when it ―monopolizes‖ or seriously 
threatens to do so.12 However two or more persons joined together into 
a ―contract,‖ ―combination,‖ or ―conspiracy‖ can violate the statute 
whenever they unreasonably ―restrain trade.‖13 
The American Needle decision could conceivably rest on 
alternative rationales for its separate entity conclusion. These are that 
(1) the teams are separately owned profit centers capable of competing 
with each other; (2) the particular agreement challenged in this case 
restrained the ability of the teams to market their IP rights 
individually; or (3) the teams themselves acting together actively 
made decisions about how their IP rights should be packaged and sold. 
The Supreme Court‘s decision depends on propositions (1) and 
(2), but not proposition (3). Indeed, the question of the individual 
teams‘ day-to-day control of sales was not all that important. Rather, 
the relevant question was who is controlled. Both lower courts had 
strongly emphasized control and so did the NFL in its main brief to 
the Supreme Court. The district court observed that the individual 
teams had placed their intellectual property rights in trust to NFL 
Properties (―NFLP‖), and that there was no evidence that this 
organization had ever ―dealt with any of the teams as independent 
organizations.‖14 The Seventh Circuit repeated that point.15 The NFL‘s 
merits brief to the Supreme Court emphasized that ―[v]irtually every 
significant decision about the production and promotion of NFL 
Football is controlled by the League‖ rather than the individual 
teams.16 
For the Supreme Court, however, the important question was 
not who controlled NFL Properties. Rather it was that NFLP was 
making decisions regarding ―the teams‘ separately owned intellectual 
property.‖17 The Court did note that each of the teams owned a share 
 
 11. The statute rather unhelpfully defines a ―person‖ as ―includ[ing] corporations and 
associations existing under or authorized‖ by law. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 12. Id. § 2 (condemning ―every ‗person‘ who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . .‖). 
 13. Id. § 1 (―Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
. . . is . . . illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty . . . .‖). 
 14. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  
 15. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2201 
(2010). 
 16. Brief for NFL Respondents at 4, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 
08–661).  
 17. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215. 
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in NFLP and that they had agreed to cooperate in setting up NFLP in 
order to exploit their IP rights; however, without that agreement 
―there would be nothing to prevent each of the teams from making its 
own market decisions.‖18 
The Supreme Court also quoted the Ninth Circuit‘s observation 
that ― ‗[a]lthough the business interests of‘ the teams 
‗will often coincide with those of the‘ NFLP ‗as an entity in itself, that 
commonality of interest exists in every cartel.‘ ‖19 The Ninth Circuit‘s 
observation also suggests the importance of who is controlled rather 
than who does the controlling. A cartel seeks to maximize the profits 
of the cartel group as a whole. By contrast, individual members of the 
cartel seek to maximize their own individual profits, which they can 
do by undercutting the cartel—typically by producing more than its 
cartel output assignment or by charging less than the cartel price. The 
question of competitive harm does not depend on who makes the day-
to-day price and output decisions, but rather on the cartel manager‘s 
ability to force its price and output decisions upon the individual 
members. 
In sum, the NFL arrangement was potentially anticompetitive, 
not because the individual teams had day-to-day control, but rather 
because they lacked it. If each team had relevant control it could have 
deviated from the price or output decisions of the group—that is, it 
could have cheated on any cartel agreement, something that would 
tend to make the cartel fall apart. NFLP as an entity became a very 
effective cartel management device precisely because under the 
arrangement the individual teams lacked the power to make their own 
agreements on the side. 
A cartel is an organization of two or more separate firms that 
coordinates output or price, although the cartel may coordinate other 
aspects of its members‘ behavior as well. The cartel reduces 
competition that might otherwise exist among cartel members.20 
Firms and cartels are both business organizations. Both are 
characterized by coordination of output and pricing. The creation and 
boundaries of both are economically motivated. A firm is created when 
the cost of doing something ―internally,‖ or through a hierarchy such 
 
 18. Id. at 2214–15. 
 19. Id. at 2215 (quoting L.A. Mem‘l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
 20. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 402, at 4–7 (3d 
ed. 2006) (discussing the nature and consequences of a perfectly competitive economy); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE  
§§ 4.1–.3, at 146–66 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing cartel price fixing, oligopoly, and collusion). 
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as an employment relationship, is cheaper in relation to results than 
is use of the market.21 A cartel is created when there are gains to be 
had from coordination of output or sales. We describe a cartel as 
―naked‖ when these gains result entirely (or almost entirely) from 
reduced market-wide output and higher prices. Some agreements 
among rivals are efficient, however, because they reduce development, 
production, or distribution costs. Such agreements can be profitable to 
the firms whether or not they have market power and even if they 
result in lower prices. We generally characterize these relationships as 
―joint ventures‖ and any restraints on price or output that they might 
contain as ―ancillary.‖22 
The lines between firms, cartels, and joint ventures are 
notoriously indistinct. For example, several farmers might form a 
partnership, which is a purely contractual relationship, if they 
consolidate their land, equipment, and operations and produce 
everything jointly. In that case the legality of their union would be 
analyzed under the law of mergers, but once the organization is 
lawfully formed its conduct that does not implicate other firms is 
treated as unilateral.23 The farmers would be a cartel, however, if all 
they did was set a price and reduce output while leaving their 
operations completely separate. In between is a whole range of 
possibilities. For example, they might farm separately but share a 
corn picker, truck, or other costly piece of equipment. They might 
market jointly through a common sales agent, and this might 
necessitate a common price.24 The antitrust law of ancillary restraints 
deals with these issues, typically by assuming that arrangements that 
 
 21. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937); see also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63 (2010), available at http:// 
www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/content/65031035h363g164/fulltext.pdf 
(examining the relationship between Coasean firms and Coasean markets). 
 22. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified 
and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (explaining the difference between naked and ancillary restraints 
and applying the per se rule to the naked restraint at issue); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1906, at 235–42 (2d ed. 2002) (defining and distinguishing naked and 
ancillary restraints). 
 23. See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 973c, at 63–66 (discussing 
transactional alternatives to mergers and joint ventures); 5 id. ¶ 1202, at 264–83 (explaining 
partial asset acquisitions); Gregory H. Werden, Initial Thoughts on the American Needle 
Decision, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2010, at 1–7, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/publishing/antitrust_source/Aug10_Werden8_2f.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the implications 
of the American Needle decision); cf. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 1 (2006) (holding it is not 
per se illegal for a lawful joint venture to set the prices at which it sells its products).  
 24. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 375–78 (1933) (upholding 
exclusive joint marketing scheme for Depression-era coal). 
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unite only a subset of the individual participants‘ production and 
distribution activities are cartels or joint ventures of separate actors 
rather than the creation of a single firm.25 
Part I of this Article discusses the American Needle decision 
and how Section One of the Sherman Act does not reach the conduct of 
single entities. Part II discusses how cartels operate, including the 
many decisions that price-fixing firms need to make and the 
operational structures that cartels adopt to make these decisions. Part 
III shows how the insights from the study of cartel decisionmaking 
structures should inform the application of American Needle to 
organizations, mainly corporations, that have some structural 
characteristics of single entities, but also have functional 
characteristics that threaten price fixing. 
I. AMERICAN NEEDLE AND THE SINGLE ENTITY ISSUE 
The Sherman Act evaluates anticompetitive conduct differently 
depending on whether the challenged restraint is characterized as 
concerted or unilateral. Section One of the Sherman Act addresses 
anticompetitive conduct that results from concerted action. Because 
agreement is required, ―unilateral activity by a single firm cannot be 
reached via this section.‖26 Absent an agreement, there is no case 
under Section One. If an agreement is proven, the resulting conduct 
can violate Section One if it unreasonably restrains trade. 
Section Two of the Sherman Act addresses unilateral conduct 
to maintain or acquire a monopoly or to attempt monopolization. The 
Supreme Court has explained that ―Section 2 makes the conduct of a 
single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously 
threatens to do so.‖27 Thus Section Two creates a higher threshold for 
antitrust liability. The monopolization offense of Section Two of the 
Sherman Act requires a dominant firm and an ―exclusionary‖ practice, 
which is a practice that destroys a rival or keeps rivals out of the 
market, permitting the monopolist to raise its price to monopoly 
levels.28 By contrast, an agreement between two or more separate 
―persons‖ is unlawful when it violates the restraint of trade 
formulation of Section One of the Sherman Act, which generally 
 
 25. See 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶¶ 2100–04, at 3–46 (providing a broad overview of 
joint ventures). 
 26. Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 286 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 27. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 28. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 651, at 96–130 (defining monopoly 
conduct). 
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means that it is reasonably calculated to result in reduced market 
output and higher prices.29 Further, particularly egregious 
agreements, such as naked price fixing or boycotts, are said to be 
unlawful ―per se,‖ which means that an actual output reduction or 
price increase need not be proven but will be presumed to result from 
the behavior itself. A restraint of trade need not exclude anyone in 
order to be unlawful; it must merely lead to higher prices as a result of 
reduced output. By contrast, a single firm acting alone may charge as 
high a price as it pleases and reduce output accordingly.30 As a result 
of these differences in statutory treatment, antitrust defendants have 
a strong incentive to characterize their conduct as unilateral, not 
concerted. 
One difficult question in Section One jurisprudence has been 
determining whether two entities linked by ownership or contract are 
legally capable of conspiring for antitrust purposes. For decades, the 
Supreme Court had held explicitly and implicitly that a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were legally capable of 
agreeing and thus satisfying the first element of a Section One cause 
of action.31 In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the 
Supreme Court overruled this line of cases and held that a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were a single entity for 
antitrust purposes. 32 As a result, agreements between them could not 
violate Section One. 
Lower courts have extended Copperweld‘s holding to a variety 
of scenarios. For example, courts have held that sibling corporations 
are incapable of conspiring,33 as are a parent and its partially owned 
subsidiary in many cases.34 The circuit courts had split as to whether 
the teams in a sports league constituted a single entity or were 
 
 29. See 7 id. ¶ 1502, at 387–90; 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 1912d, at 326–39 
(discussing restraint of trade in horizontal trade cases). 
 30. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 720, at 3–11 (examining why 
monopolies are allowed to charge a profit-maximizing price). 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat‘l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116–17 (1975) (finding 
conspiracy between a bank and its partially owned branches); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 
332 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1947) (finding a conspiracy between a taxicab manufacturing company 
and its wholly- or partially-owned operating company subsidiaries); 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 20, at 205–13 (providing a general overview of Supreme Court cases on antitrust-
related conspiracy cases).  
 32. 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). 
 33. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a ―single 
entity in a parent-subsidiary relationship‖ is incapable of violating Section One of the Sherman 
Act). 
 34. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Cal. 
1994). 
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capable of agreeing and thus satisfying the first element of a Section 
One cause of action. Some courts had held that the members of a 
professional sports league represented a single entity for many 
purposes and, thus, could not run afoul of Section One.35 Other courts 
have declined to extend Copperweld to shield teams in sports leagues 
from Section One liability.36 
The Supreme Court resolved the split in American Needle. The 
thirty-two teams that belong to the NFL granted individual exclusive 
licenses to their trademarks and related rights to an NFL-formed 
company, NFLP. NFLP in turn granted an exclusive license for the 
manufacture of caps and headgear bearing these logos to Reebok. 
American Needle, which had previously manufactured NFL-logoed 
caps, was ousted from this market for ten years by the exclusive 
contract. It sued the NFL and its team owners for violating Section 
One by engaging in a concerted refusal to deal. Adhering to its 
previous decision in Chicago Professional Sports,37 the Seventh Circuit 
held that the NFL was a single entity, and that Copperweld insulated 
it and the member teams from Section One liability. 38 The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
Under Copperweld and its progeny, American Needle was an 
absolutely orthodox antitrust decision and the Seventh Circuit‘s 
approach an outlier. The NFL teams were individually owned and had 
individual profit centers,39 employment relationships,40 productive 
assets, and IP rights. To be sure, their principal activity—playing 
football for profit—was heavily managed by a central organization, 
but under standard, traditional antitrust analysis this would not 
 
 35. E.g., Chi. Prof‘l Sports Ltd. P‘ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
professional basketball teams, although separately owned, were more similar to a single entity 
than multiple entities for purposes of an antitrust challenge to broadcast contracts); cf. Eleven 
Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass‘n, 213 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding a single entity 
where amateur soccer teams were not separately owned). 
 36. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that 
the teams were distinct entities even though they were commonly owned). For a full discussion of 
all lower court post-Copperweld decisions, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶¶ 1467–
69, at 237–58. 
 37. 95 F.3d at 593. 
 38. Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 741–44 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2201 
(2010). 
 39. The NFL historically prohibited both public ownership of the teams as well as cross-
ownership. But see N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding 
that the NFL cross-ownership ban as applied to non-football teams violated the Sherman Act). 
 40. While the NFL member teams each hired and competed for players, they engaged in 
multi-employer collective bargaining as a group. See Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 234–35 
(1996) (describing one instance of the NFL‘s collective bargaining process). 
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change the NFL from a joint venture into a single firm because all of 
the business relationships among the individual teams were purely 
contractual.41 The teams could have created alternative business 
arrangements. For example, one very large corporation might have 
owned all of the NFL teams and operated them as a single entity, 
arranging games among them, collecting the revenue, and paying the 
players and other staff centrally. In that case there would not be 
separate profit centers.42 
In deciding that the NFL was a collaboration rather than a 
single entity, the Supreme Court focused on two things, one 
essentially structural and one functional. First, the Court considered 
whether the organization in question was in fact a union of separate 
economic decisionmakers who have some residual and potentially 
competing business interests.43 This inquiry is structural, in the sense 
that it asks whether there are multiple profit centers that have 
ownership interests that are independent of one another. If no such 
separate ownership interests are found, as was true in Copperweld, 
then we are looking at a single firm.44 
Given that such separate interests existed, the Supreme Court 
next considered whether the particular restraint being challenged 
―deprives the marketplace of independent centers of 
decisionmaking.‖45 That is, the challenged restraint must be one that 
 
 41. See, e.g., id. (assuming that NFL teams were a combination of separate actors for 
purposes of collective bargaining disputes and finding labor immunity); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (treating NCAA as a combination of its individual teams 
and applying the rule of reason to output limitations on national television advertising). 
 42. E.g. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that the 
teams were separate entities notwithstanding common ownership); see also 7 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 1478d3, at 368–77 (discussing the impact of American Needle on 
lower courts).  
 43. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (―The NFL teams do not possess 
either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power 
characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams is a substantial, independently owned, 
and independently managed business. [Further,] ‗their general corporate actions are guided or 
determined‘ by ‗separate corporate consciousnesses,‘ and ‗[t]heir objectives are‘ not ‗common.‘ ‖) 
(quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)). 
 44. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 753 (1984) (holding a 
parent and wholly owned but separately incorporated subsidiary to be a single actor for antitrust 
purposes). Justice Stevens, the author of American Needle, dissented in Copperweld. Id. at 778–
96. 
 45. Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property. 
To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of 
valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intellectual property, it is not pursuing 
the ―common interests of the whole‖ league but is instead pursuing interests of each ―corporation 
itself,‖ teams are acting as ―separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,‖ and 
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limits the market behavior of these independent economic actors in 
some fashion.46 For example, the NFL clearly qualifies as a 
consortium of actors under the structural definition. But suppose that 
the antitrust challenge was to an exclusive license given by the NFL 
for reproduction of its own ―NFL‖ logo, or perhaps to the NFL‘s 
decision to fire a staff member who worked for the NFL rather than 
the member teams. None of the individual teams has an obvious 
proprietary interest in the NFL logo or most of the NFL‘s own 
employment decisions. With respect to the NFL logo, they have no 
individual rights to license it, and as a result the license agreement 
does not limit any right to sell that they would otherwise have. 
Treating the NFL as a single entity on that issue might be appropriate 
for purposes of licensing the NFL logo, but not for purposes of 
licensing the various logos owned by the individual teams.47 This is 
consistent with well-established rules for joint ventures, which find 
 
each team therefore is a potential ―independent cente[r] of decisionmaking.‖ Decisions by NFL 
teams to license their separately owned trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are 
decisions that ―depriv[e] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,‖ and 
therefore of actual or potential competition. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld, 
467 U.S. at 769, 770) (alterations in original). 
 46. Id. (―Although NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, 
they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team 
trademarks are not necessarily aligned.‖) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures 
and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–61, and Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of 
Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 69–81 
(1987)). 
 47. See id. at 2214–15 (―[F]or the same reasons the 32 teams' conduct is covered by § 1, 
NFLP's actions also are subject to § 1, at least with regards to its marketing of property owned 
by the separate teams . . . . For that reason, decisions by NFLP regarding the teams' separately 
owned intellectual property constitute concerted action.‖). In a footnote the Supreme Court also 
found it unnecessary to consider the position of the United States: 
For the purposes of resolving this case, there is no need to pass upon the 
Government's position that entities are incapable of conspiring under § 1 if they ―have 
effectively merged the relevant aspect of their operations, thereby eliminating actual 
and potential competition . . . in that operational sphere‖ and ―the challenged 
restraint [does] not significantly affect actual or potential competition . . . outside 
their merged operations.‖ Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. The 
Government urges that the choices ―to offer only a blanket license‖ and ―to have only a 
single headwear licensee‖ might not constitute concerted action under its test. Id., at 
32. However, because the teams still own their own trademarks and are free to 
market those trademarks as they see fit, even those two choices were agreements 
amongst potential competitors and would constitute concerted action under the 
Government's own standard. At any point, the teams could decide to license their own 
trademarks. It is significant, moreover, that the teams here control NFLP. The two 
choices that the Government might treat as independent action, although nominally 
made by NFLP, are for all functional purposes choices made by the 32 entities with 
potentially competing interests. 
Id. at 2216 n.9. 
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their activities to be unilateral in some cases but not in others, 
depending on the nature of the challenged conduct.48 
The majority‘s opinion did not address the actual legality of the 
collective licensing arrangement. The issue before the Court was 
solely whether the teams of the NFL were capable of conspiring. While 
the NFL is a legitimate joint venture, the agreement on collective 
licensing represents concerted action that falls within the reach of 
Section One. 
Organization into a single firm for state-law purposes is not 
dispositive of the antitrust issue of single entity status. For example, 
while partnerships and other unincorporated entities are creatures of 
the common law, they can be treated as single entities for antitrust 
purposes.49 Indeed, even much looser organizations of businesses or 
individuals bound only by a contract are treated as a single entity for 
some purposes.50 On the other side, American Needle cited both the 
Sealy and Topco cases as correctly decided examples of single 
incorporated entities that were treated as conspiracies for federal 
antitrust purposes.51 Clearly, for example, the members of a cartel 
could not avoid Section One of the Sherman Act by creating a 
corporation, placing their individual CEOs on the board of directors, 
and giving this corporation authority over the individual firm‘s output 
and prices. The CEOs are still independent competitors even if they 
occasionally sit around the same boardroom table. As American Needle 
indicates, distinguishing a firm from a cartel requires looking beyond 
the form of the business organization to more fundamental issues 
about how entities make decisions and the economic identities of those 
 
 48. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 1478, at 340–77 (summarizing case law 
concerning whether joint venture decisions are unilateral or collaborative).  
 49. E.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385–92 (1922) 
(finding an unincorporated labor union to be a single entity); United States v. Greater N.Y. Live 
Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 30 F.2d 939, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (holding that an 
unincorporated association was covered by the Sherman Act). 
 50. E.g., Toscano v. PGA, 258 F.3d 978, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating a professional 
golfers association as a single entity); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass‘n, 213 F.3d 
198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (treating a volunteer association of coaches and players as a single 
entity); Am. Council of Podiatric Physicians v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, 185 F.3d 606, 620–
22 (6th Cir. 1999) (treating a professional association of podiatrists as a single entity rather than 
a cartel of podiatrists); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding an 
association of newspapers better treated as a single entity than as a conspiracy of its member 
newspapers); Nat‘l Camp Ass‘n v. Am. Camping Ass‘n, No. 99 Civ. 11853 DLC, 2000 WL 
1844764, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2000) (treating an incorporated association of campgrounds 
as a single entity). 
 51. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). 
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who are controlled. While the question ―who is in control‖ can be 
important, usually it is not nearly as important as the question ―who 
is controlled.‖ For example, in Copperweld the parent firm was almost 
certainly in control of the actions of its subsidiary, which was wholly 
owned. The reason the Supreme Court found a single firm, however, 
was that there was no separately owned entity whose market behavior 
was being controlled. 
II. CARTEL DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURES 
In order to understand how lower courts should apply 
American Needle to organizations whose constituents have distinct 
profit centers, one must consider how price-fixing cartels, the primary 
concern of Section One, operate. This Part reviews the multitude of 
decisions that firms in a cartel must make and the various 
decisionmaking structures that cartels have adopted. 
A. Decisions that Cartels Must Make 
Price fixing seems straight forward: rival firms agree to fix a 
price above the competitive level. By colluding instead of competing, 
the firms in a market can maximize their profits at consumers‘ 
expense. Cartelization, in reality, is far more complicated. The 
difference between successful cartels and failed attempts is often a 
function of the conspirators‘ ability to create and implement 
appropriate decisionmaking structures.52 This Section examines the 
multitude of decisions that price-fixing conspirators must make in 
order to create and stabilize their illegal cartel. The decisions are 
broken into two categories: coordinating the terms of the cartel 
agreement and enforcing the agreement once it is made. 
1. Coordinating Cartel Terms 
Cartels require a great deal of coordination. How explicit the 
communications and resulting agreements need to be depends on 
market conditions and the nature of the competitors‘ relationships 
with each other. 
 
 52. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 86 (2006) (―Successful cartels develop mechanisms for sharing 
information, making decisions, and manipulating incentives through self-imposed carrots and 
sticks.‖). 
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a. Price 
In theory, each cartel has a profit-maximizing price that the 
members of the cartel will agree to set. But the theory often 
oversimplifies reality for several reasons. First, co-conspirators may 
not have the same profit-maximizing price. Differences in firm size, 
efficiency, or product can complicate price-fixing negotiations. For 
example, firms with lower costs will favor a lower cartel price while 
firms with higher costs want a higher price.53 If the market is product 
differentiated there may not be a single optimum price, but it will 
have to be a compromise.54 Because different firms within a cartel may 
advocate different price targets, the decision on what price to fix 
requires a deliberative process and a series of compromises.55 
Second, even if the members of a cartel share similar cost 
structures, which would indicate the presence of a single profit-
maximizing cartel price, the conspirators may disagree about whether 
to charge it. The fixed price needs to be high enough to maximize 
profits, but not so high as to induce new competitors into the market. 
The decisionmaking calculus for single entities and cartels is similar.56 
In both situations, the decisionmaker attempts to calculate the profit-
maximizing output and price levels. That level is generally determined 
by the point at which the firm‘s marginal cost equals its marginal 
revenue.57 For an individual firm, a firm‘s board of directors is charged 
 
 53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 148 (examining how cartels fix prices); see also 
James M. Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons For OPEC?, in ECONOMICS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF F.G. ADAMS 179, 179–206 
(Lawrence R. Klein & Jaime Marquez eds., 1989) (examining the characteristics of fifty-four 
different cartels to determine what makes a cartel successful in the long-term). 
 54. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 148.  
 55. These price negotiations are dangerous for cartel members because they increase the 
risk of detection and consequent criminal penalties. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying 
text. 
 56. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 146–59 (describing the basic economics of price 
fixing); David E. Mills & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Cartel Problems: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 
938, 940 (1978) (comparing single joint profit-maximizing points with multiple joint profit-
maximizing points); D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 841 (1976) 
(discussing the effect of single, nonmember firms on cartel pricing); see also George A. Hay & 
Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 26–27 
(1974) (suggesting that conspiracies are most likely to arise when ―numbers are small, 
concentration is high, and the product is homogenous‖). 
 57. Assuming that all of the individual cartel members have identical costs, the cartel‘s 
profit maximizing output and price are the same as that of a single firm monopolist with the 
same cost function. To the extent that cartel members‘ individual costs differ from one another, 
calculation of the optimal output and how it should be assigned is correspondingly more complex. 
In general, a monopolist would cut its output by closing its least efficient plants first and 
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with maximizing the firm‘s value, which generally means selling at 
the profit-maximizing output and price.58 For a cartel, the conspirators 
make a similar calculation, either through a participatory process or a 
centralized decisionmaker. 
Third, in addition to fixing list price, some cartel pricing 
structures allow for quantity or other discounts.59 Firms may find 
agreements on list price relatively easy to reach, but then face heated 
disagreements about the nature of discounts.60 Over time, some 
cartels, such as the copper plumbing tubes cartel, try to simplify the 
operations by reducing the availability of discounts and rebates.61 
After cartelizing the three-billion dollar worldwide market for 
graphite electrodes, the members of that cartel eliminated discounts 
altogether.62 Additionally, international cartels must make allowances 
for currency exchange rate issues.63 
Further complicating the pricing decisions, many cartels have 
had to negotiate and fix multiple prices. For example, the citric acid 
and plasterboard cartels had to routinely agree to two sets of prices, 
one for preferred larger customers and a higher one for other 
customers.64 Other cartels—including those in electrical and 
mechanical carbon and graphite products—have employed far more 
complicated price schedules that ―allowed for many different prices 
depending on the particular characteristics of the product and the 
 
producing the residual output only from the lowest cost facilities. As a practical matter, a cartel 
may not have that option because it could entail that some high-cost members shut down 
completely. 
 58. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 20–22 (9th 
ed. 2007) (discussing present value and the opportunity cost of capital); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 386 
(2009) (discussing the Coasean vision of the firm as a profit-maximizer); Michael C. Jensen, 
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 9 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=220671 (proposing a new system for value maximization called enlightened value 
maximization). 
 59. Joseph E. Harrington, How Do Cartels Operate?, 2 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS 
MACROECONOMICS 1, 12 (2006). 
 60. Id. at 15 (―Though there did not appear to be much disagreement among firms over 
price, there is a well-documented episode of disagreement with regards to discounts. In the 
isostatic graphite cartel, members disagreed about the 20% discount to machine shops and 
distributors; the source of the disagreement appeared to be the different composition of cartel 
members‘ demands.‖). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Robert D. Paul & J. Mark Gidley, Price Fixing Begins to Hit Bottom Line, LEGAL TIMES, 
May 4, 1998, at S44. 
 63. Harrington, supra note 59, at 12. 
 64. Id. at 7, 15. 
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buyer.‖65 Similar to the international vitamin cartel of the 1990s, the 
heavy equipment cartel of the 1950s was actually a series of 
overlapping, multi-faceted cartels involving upwards of forty 
manufacturers selling expensive equipment in more than twenty 
product lines.66 
Many cartels must also coordinate the timing of their 
announcements of higher prices. Simultaneous price increases could 
draw the attention of antitrust authorities. Cartels sought to decrease 
this risk by staggering their price hikes. For example, after fixing the 
prices for the upcoming year, the corporate officials who ran the 
international vitamins cartel also agreed on who would announce each 
price increase and the date of each announcement.67 Other cartels 
employed ―a clear orchestration of who would move first and when 
other firms would follow which could be in days, weeks, or even 
months. This has been documented for cartels in carbonless paper, 
electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products, copper 
plumbing tubes, fine arts auction houses, and sorbates.‖68 
These negotiations could be difficult because no firm wants to 
be the first to announce a price increase. Being seen as aggressive 
regarding price hikes can create a public relations problem. In the lag 
time between price announcements, the later-moving firms can take 
sales from the price leader.69 This temporary asymmetry could 
destabilize a cartel. For example, in the auction house price-fixing 
conspiracy, Christie‘s had agreed to be the first to announce a new 
nonnegotiable minimum commission and then lost a major 
consignment to its co-conspirator who had not yet announced the same 
nonnegotiable term.70 This led the CEO of Christie‘s to fear that his 
cartel partner at Sotheby‘s ―was doublecrossing him.‖71 
Because cartels often experience cheating by their members, 
merely fixing the price of the product is often insufficient on its own to 
create a stable cartel.72 Empirically, cartel members frequently cheat 
 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal 
Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 837, 838 (1993). 
 67. Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International 
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 715 (2001).  
 68. Harrington, supra note 59, at 20–21. 
 69. Id. at 24. 
 70. CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBY‘S-CHRISTIE‘S 
AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL 166 (2004). 
 71. Id.  
 72. See infra notes 96–100 (discussing cartel cheating and common responses). 
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by honoring the cartel price on the product at issue, but then granting 
a discount on a complementary good or service. For example, cartel 
member firms may charge the cartel price but provide delivery service 
at a loss, thereby effectively selling the cartelized product at a 
discount.73 Cartels have responded to this risk by regulating collateral 
prices or services as well. For example, the sugar cartel ―regulated 
storage rates, freight rates, delivery times, and delivery methods, all 
to prevent hidden price cuts from being buried in the details.‖74 The 
cement cartel forbade its members from using trucks, and enlisted 
cooperative railroad officials to help enforce price fixing in the cement 
industry.75 Also, under the cement cartel code, ―the cement producers 
were also barred from competing through different ways of wrapping 
and shipping their product or through making different charges or 
allowances for cement bags.‖76 More recently, in the auction house 
price-fixing conspiracy, in addition to fixing nonnegotiable 
commissions, the members also sought to prevent waivers of related 
expenses, including catalog illustrations, shipping, and insurance 
charges.77 Similarly, the firms in the industrial and medical gases 
cartel adopted minimum transport charges and imposed a new drop 
charge on bulk deliveries in order to prevent circumvention of the 
cartel price through discounted delivery.78 In addition to price, the 
scope of these ancillary agreements had to be negotiated and agreed 
upon by all cartel members.79 
In some cases, cartel members developed complicated pricing 
formulas that cover a range of products and buyers. The electrical and 
mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel provides an example: 
The most important purpose of the cartel was to agree on the prices to be charged to 
customers in different countries for the many different varieties of electrical and 
mechanical carbon and graphite products. For this purpose, the cartel members first 
agreed on a pricing method which calculated the sales price by reference to a number of 
factors. The basis of the scheme was the calculation of the price for carbon brushes. 
 
 73. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 624 (2004). 
 74. Id. at 579 (citing David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and 
Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 383 (2001)). 
 75. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL PRICING PRACTICE 201 (1949). 
 76. Id. at 80 (citing Brief in Support of the Complaint at 414–22, Fed. Trade Comm‘n v. 
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (No. 3,167)) (―It was against the rules of the Compendium, for 
example, to grant allowances for cloth sacks when they were not returned in good order.‖). 
 77. MASON, supra note 70, at 169. 
 78. Harrington, supra note 59, at 12. 
 79. See id. at 6 (―Collusion also extended to prices for ancillary services and non-price 
dimensions in order to avoid cheating through these avenues.‖). 
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These were divided into three groups: industrial brushes, midget brushes and 
exceptions. Within each of the first two groups, the volume of the carbon or graphite 
material in question would be determined in cubic centimetre.80 
Pricing agreements with several moving parts required more 
involved negotiation and renegotiation than simple cartels involving a 
homogenous product in a single market. 
In some markets, price fixing takes the form of bid rigging. 
This is more complicated than fixing a single price. For each contract, 
the cartel members must decide which cartel will have the lowest bid, 
what it will be, and what the remaining cartel members will bid in 
order to lose the contract. The failure to execute this properly can 
expose the cartel. For example, the heavy equipment cartel of the 
1950s and 1960s was discovered when a reporter culled through the 
purchasing records of the Tennessee Valley Authority and noticed that 
―at least 47 large and small American manufacturers have taken part 
in identical bidding on a wide variety of items in the past three 
years.‖81 To prevent exposure, bid riggers assign bids and agree to 
rotate the winning bids in a manner that does not raise suspicion. 
b. Production Limits and Market Allocation 
Many cartels find it preferable to set output or sales limits 
either instead of or in addition to fixing the price.82 Some cartels set 
 
 80. Id. at 9–10 (quoting EMCG-EC2, 91-3).  
 81. JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN 
THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 29 (1962). The record in the Cement Institute case two decades prior 
to the heavy equipment cartel had produced the following set of bids on a job sought by the 
United States Engineer Office, Tucumcari, New Mexico, April 23, 1936, all identical to the one 
ten-thousandth cent per barrel: 
 
Name of Price Name of Price 
Bidder per Bbl. Bidder per Bbl. 
     
Monarch $3.286854 Oklahoma $3.286854 
Ash Grove 3.286854 Consolidated 3.286854 
Lehigh 3.286854 Trinity 3.286854 
Southwestern 3.286854 Lone Star 3.286854 
U. S. Portland Cement Co. 3.286854 Universal 3.286854 
  Colorado 3.286854 
 
Fed. Trade Comm‘n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 713 n.15 (1948). See generally Vernon A. 
Mund, Identical Bid Prices, 68 J. POL. ECON. 150, 150 (1960) (discussing identical bid process). 
 82. See, e.g., SIMON N. WHITNEY, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONTROL 70 (1934) 
(discussing the cotton cartel). 
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limits on output, others on inputs. For example, the Cotton-Textile 
Institute had its members pledge to limit their day shifts to fifty-five 
hours per week, and their night shifts to fifty.83 Depending on the 
relative efficiency of the various cartel members, firms may advocate 
very different limits. 
Assuming that total production limits are agreed to, price-
fixing firms must then decide how to apportion the total quantity 
produced.84 Output must be allocated among cartel members, and 
there may not be a single equilibrium solution that simultaneously 
maximizes the profits for every cartel member. That is, the size of 
total output is measurable by reference to market demand, but the 
division of the cartel surplus represents a problem similar to that of a 
bilateral monopoly.85 There is no ―natural‖ solution. Intuitively, 
perfectly identical firms might divide the output equally, but that 
would not necessarily be the case and, in any event, firms always 
differ from one another. Smaller firms will tend to want to see output 
divided evenly; larger ones will want it to be divided in proportion to 
historical output. When historical output is used, firms may disagree 
about which years to use as the reference period, some preferring the 
previous year and others a range of years.86 Each firm presumably 
angles to select a time frame that maximizes the firm‘s future sales at 
the cartel price. Finally, newer firms may advocate productive 
capacity instead of historical sales as the basis for cartel allocations, 
again because they fare better under such a measure.87 
Additionally, some cartels allocate specific customers.88 For 
example, to stabilize the various vitamin cartels, Roche and Rhone-
 
 83. Id. at 71 (―This plan, proposed in January, 1930, and accepted by practically 75% of the 
industry within four months, continued in force until July, 1933.‖). In one well known antitrust 
decision, the National Window Glass Manufacturers association reached an agreement under 
which one group of firms operated for six months of the year while the other group operated for 
the other six months. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes approved the agreement as a 
reasonable way of allocating a shortage of laborers. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United 
States, 263 U.S. 403, 413 (1923).  
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing volume 
allocation in the lysine cartel). 
 85. See ROGER D. BLAIR AND JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(forthcoming 2011) (noting that in a bilateral monopoly, the output is typically determinable, but 
the division of the surplus is indeterminate and must be negotiated); Hovenkamp, supra note 21, 
at 15. 
 86. Harrington, supra note 59, at 28–30 (discussing examples in copper plumbing tubes, 
organic peroxides, vitamins A and E, folic acid, and citric acid cartels). 
 87. Id. at 31 (discussing lysine cartel). 
 88. Id. at 6, 24. 
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Poulenc agreed not to pursue certain customers.89 Such agreements 
are relatively common in cartels.90 Customer allocation agreements 
stabilize a cartel by reducing the ability and the incentive to cheat.91 
In the case of a particularly large customer, cartel members may agree 
to share a customer, for example by taking turns as to who gets the 
contract.92 In such a case, the conspiring firms had to negotiate how to 
rotate the contract in a manner that did not look too suspicious.93 
c. Coordinating Artificial Standards 
In addition to—or as a prelude to—fixing price, some firms also 
standardize their product lines with those of other cartel members. In 
markets with homogeneous products, cartels are more stable.94 It may 
be hard to agree upon a single set price when the firms in a cartel sell 
products of varying quality and sizes. Further, cheating may be 
harder to detect when firms are selling more diverse products. This 
reduces the life of a cartel.95 To address these problems, some cartels 
attempt to standardize their products.96 For example, the turn-of-the-
century cement cartel standardized the minimum specifications and 
members declined to ―accept[ ] specifications calling for better 
 
 89. DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 233 (2004). 
 90. Harrington, supra note 59, at 37 (discussing the chlorine and chloride cartel). 
 91. See BOIES, supra note 89, at 233 (―By assigning particular customers to particular 
suppliers, the conspirators reduce the incentive suppliers have to depart from the agreed price in 
search of more sales.‖). 
 92. Harrington, supra note 59, at 40 (discussing zinc phosphate cartel). 
 93. Id.  
 94. Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 247 (1996) 
(―As predicted by theory, cartels tended to export relatively homogeneous, less highly processed 
commodities.‖). On product standardization agreements facilitating collusion, see 13 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2136, at 231–32 (2d ed. 2005). 
 95. Dick, supra note 94, at 250 (―For example, cartels covering slightly more differentiated 
products such as textiles and office equipment dissolved after members discovered that ‗foreign 
market development could be better handled on an individual basis.‘‖). 
 96. E.g., United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 185 (3d. 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (defendants eliminated lower quality bathroom 
fixtures that had been subject to heavy discounting); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 
197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952) (defendants standardized fire 
extinguishers in order to facilitate bid rigging); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm‘n, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (defendants standardized milk containers in order to 
facilitate bid rigging, and court stated, ―it was easier to reach the goal of uniform prices on a 
standard product than on one which was not‖); see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 
U.S. 643, 644–45 (1980) (per curiam) (standardization of credit terms); Plymouth Dealers' Ass‘n 
of N. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1960) (standardization of trade-in 
allowances on used cars); see also Harrington, supra note 59, at 5–8. 
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qualities.‖97 Alternatively, cartels may agree to limit the varieties of a 
product available for sale. For example, 
[t]he approach of having standardized products was also taken in the graphite 
electrodes cartel as the firms: ―agreed to charge certain premiums on the price of large-
size electrodes, namely a surcharge on the price charged for standard 24-inch electrodes 
(for example, a 10% premium for 28-inch electrodes and a 40% premium for 30-inch 
electrodes).‖98 
Such agreements can lead to tension when a cartel member 
seeks to introduce a slightly different product, as when one firm 
destabilized the graphite electrodes cartel by introducing a 28.75-inch 
model at the 28-inch model price.99 The coordination of the artificial 
standards helps stabilize the cartel but restricts the ability of member 
firms to develop new products. Based on their individual research 
agendas, different firms may advocate different standards. 
Disagreements over product size and quality can disrupt a cartel.100 
d. Renegotiation 
Even when rival firms can come to an initial agreement, the 
need for renegotiation means that coordination issues remain for the 
life of a cartel. Disagreements within cartels are common.101 Over 
time, smaller firms may demand larger allotments.102 In order to keep 
a cartel continuing, a firm may agree to sacrifice some of its market 
share to a cartel partner.103 The inability to agree on new prices and 
volume allocations, in light of changing market conditions and cartel 
firm demands, can result in a cartel dissolving.104 
Cartel negotiations are perilous because every firm at the table 
has the same leverage: decline to participate in the conspiracy and 
nobody reaps cartel profits. Price-fixing conspiracies differ from other 
 
 97. MACHLUP, supra note 75, at 80 (citing Brief in Support of the Complaint at 414–22, Fed. 
Trade Comm‘n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (No. 3,167)). 
 98. Harrington, supra note 59, at 9 (quoting Graphite electrodes EC, 56). 
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. See, e.g., Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels 
and Developing Countries: Economics Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 835–36 (2004) (discussing disagreements within the graphic electrodes 
cartel). 
 101. Id.; Larry R. Stewart, Canada’s Role in the International Uranium Cartel, 35 INT‘L ORG. 
657, 663 (1981) (discussing disagreements within the uranium cartel). 
 102. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 31 (discussing dispute within lysine cartel). 
 103. See id. at 33 (―Though stability of market shares was common, it was not universal. In 
negotiating in 1992 in the market for vitamin B2, Roche agreed to allow BASF‘s market share to 
rise from 35% in 1990 to 38% by 1994.‖). 
 104. See Dick, supra note 94, at 249–50 (discussing potash cartel). 
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conspiracies in that the market determines the necessary participants. 
In a traditional conspiracy—say, bankrobbing—if the driver of the 
getaway vehicle backs out, the remaining conspirators can bring in 
another driver. In a price-fixing conspiracy, if a firm that supplies a 
significant market share (or has the productive capacity to do so) 
departs, then the cartel cannot achieve its aims because when the 
remaining conspirators reduce output and increase price, the 
nonmember firm can supply the unmet the demand. Because a firm‘s 
exit from the cartel means the cartel will dissolve, cartel negotiations 
take place under mutual threats of withdrawal. Every firm has the 
dual incentive to make demands in order to maximize its return and 
to accommodate cartel partners‘ demands to prevent exit. 
2. Enforcement of the Agreed-Upon Terms 
Rival firms agree to fix prices because it increases their 
expected profits. Another course of conduct increases profits even 
further: joining a cartel and then cheating by selling more than one‘s 
cartel allotment and/or charging less than the cartel-fixed price.105 
When a cartel is reducing its output and raising price to the cartel‘s 
maximizing level, each individual cartel member‘s marginal revenue 
is greater than its marginal cost; that is, each cartel member is 
earning more per unit sold than the incremental cost of furnishing 
that unit. While this proposition is readily proven mathematically, it 
is also quite intuitive.106 The output and price of a perfectly 
functioning monopolist and a perfectly functioning cartel are identical. 
That is, whatever the profit-maximizing price is for the monopolist, 
the cartel maximizes its aggregate profits by setting output and price 
to that level, and then dividing up the output among the members. If 
the monopolist cuts price from the monopoly level, it loses money 
because the price cut on its entire output is greater than the amount 
of additional profits it earns by producing more. For example, if the 
profit-maximizing output and price are one hundred units at ten 
dollars per unit, a price cut to nine dollars is necessarily unprofitable 
even though sales rise to 108 units, because the additional profits from 
the increased sales are more than offset by the lost profits from the 
price reduction. 
 
 105. Leslie, supra note 73, at 526.  
 106. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 149–50; FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 244–45 (3d ed. 1990). 
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The individual cartel member is in a different position, 
however. Suppose that the cartel has ten identical members and each 
one is producing ten of these one hundred units at the profit-
maximizing price. Now one cartel member surreptitiously lowers its 
price to nine dollars, bringing the eight extra units into the market. 
For the monopolist, the output increase resulting from the price cut 
was eight percent, but for the single member of a ten-identical firm 
cartel it is eighty percent, making it far more likely to be profitable. 
Further, that is not the entire story. The cheater‘s price cut will 
induce some existing customers within the one-hundred units to 
switch away from their seller and to the cheater, giving the cheater an 
even larger output increase. Of course, the success of all of this 
depends on the cheater‘s ability to cut the price while the other cartel 
members hold their position. If the cheating is detected, or if other 
members decide to cheat as well, the cartel is likely to fall apart and 
competition will break out.107 
In sum, each individual cartel member has an incentive to 
―cheat‖ on the cartel by producing more than its assigned output. 
Stories of such cartel cheating are common,108 and this excess of 
individual firm marginal revenue over marginal cost is one of the 
principal reasons that cartels become unstable and fall apart, even 
when they are legal.109 The absence of effective enforcement 
mechanisms has led to the demise of many cartels.110 
Consequently, successful cartels develop mechanisms for 
detecting and punishing cheating. Common methods for detecting 
deviations from a cartel agreement include requiring all cartel 
members to report their sales figures, utilizing auditors, and 
employing an independent cartel administrator.111 Once cheating is 
identified, the cartel must discipline the defecting firm in order to 
 
 107. On cartel cheating and the relationship between the size of the markup and the 
likelihood of cheating, see GEORGE M. STOCKING & MYRON M. WATKINS, CARTELS OR 
COMPETITION? 94 (1948). 
 108. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1018 (1988) (noting that, for example, in the railroad 
industry, both collusion and cheating were widespread during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries). 
 109. See Robert H. Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 
415, 416–18 (1985) (writing on price wars as cartel destabilizers). 
 110. Dick, supra note 94, at 249 (―Webb-Pomerene cartels dissolved under two general sets of 
circumstances. The first were enforcement failures. Many price-fixing cartels were undermined 
by their failure to detect and punish members‘ attempts to undercut the agreed-on price or to 
exceed quota allocations.‖). 
 111. Leslie, supra note 73, at 611–15. 
3b. Hovenkamp_Leslie_Page.doc 4/27/2011 11:58 AM 
836 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:3:813 
make the lapse nonprofitable and to deter future transgressions. Some 
cartels employ price wars.112 The more common approach, however, is 
to have accounting and reimbursement among the affected cartel 
members. Many cartels employ buyback programs to deal with firms 
that sell more than their cartel allotment. For example, as part of the 
agreement by members of the citric acid cartel, to balance the cartel 
books at the end of 1991, one firm that sold too much, Haarmann & 
Reimer, was required to buy 7,000 tons of citric acid from ADM, which 
had sold less than its cartel allotment.113 While effective, buyback 
schemes require ― ‗continuous monitoring‘ to assess how sales matched 
up with quotas.‖114 In short, the cartel‘s enforcement mechanism 
requires constant coordination. 
3. Summary 
In sum, cartels require an extreme amount of coordination 
about issues beyond the mere fixing of a price. While every cartel faces 
its own problems in formation and continuity, the international 
graphite electrodes cartel is fairly typical for successful, profitable 
cartels: 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice‘s investigation, cartel members agreed to: 
(1) increase and maintain prices, (2) eliminate price discounts, (3) allocate volume 
among conspirators, (4) divide the world market among themselves and designate the 
price leader in each region, (5) reduce or eliminate exports to members‘ home markets, 
(6) restrict capacity, (7) restrict non-conspirator companies‘ access to certain graphite 
electrode manufacturing technology, (8) exchange sales and customer information in 
order to monitor and enforce the cartel agreement, and (9) issue price announcements 
and price quotations in accordance with the agreement.115 
The amount, difficulty, and variety of coordination issues can 
speed the demise of the price-fixing cartel. In his empirical study of 
export cartels, Andrew Dick noted that ―cartels . . . dissolved when 
their coordination costs outweighed their service value to members.‖116 
Consequently, firms must develop cost-effective ways to 
negotiate, implement, and enforce their cartel agreements. A common 
 
 112. See id. at 618–20 (discussing examples); see also Harrington, supra note 59, at 63 (―In 
the carbonless paper cartel, cartel member AWA had a market share in Europe of 30–35% and 
was the largest producer with capacity exceeding twice that of any other firm. It used its 
dominant position in the market to threaten aggressive pricing if firms did not comply with the 
collusive agreement.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
 113. Harrington, supra note 59, at 57–58. 
 114. Id. at 58 (discussing the citric acid and vitamins A and E cartels). 
 115. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 833 (citation omitted). 
 116. Dick, supra note 94, at 250 . 
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feature of these structures is that they often minimize the role of 
individual cartel members in making day-to-day output or price 
decisions, assign it to an entity that has the power to determine the 
profit-maximizing rate, and impose it on the individual members. The 
entity may be owned by the cartel members or have cartel members on 
its acting board, but none of this is essential and it may be 
counterproductive to the extent that the incentives of individual 
members diverge from those of the cartel as a whole. As the Supreme 
Court observed in American Needle, the interests of the individual 
teams are ―not necessarily aligned‖ with those of the NFL as a body.117 
B. The Structures of Cartel Decisionmaking 
In order to coordinate the many aspects of a price-fixing cartel, 
member firms need to craft a process for making decisions. In a price-
fixing conspiracy with only two cartel partners, such as the auction 
house cartel, the decisionmaking is necessarily democratic to the 
extent that all decisions must be negotiated and agreed to by every 
cartel participant.118 As the number of conspirators rises, however, the 
fixed price can be reached by consensus, by committee, or by a 
centralized agent to whom price-setting authority has been delegated. 
This Section reviews the various decisionmaking schema employed by 
cartels. Cartels range from relatively democratic to more centralized. 
On either side of this spectrum, successful cartels construct a 
sophisticated organizational structure to gather information, to make 
decisions, and to communicate and enforce their diktats. 
1. Democratic Cartels 
While economic theory suggests that cartels should be difficult 
to form and maintain in industries with a large number of 
competitors, price-fixing cartels do exist in such markets.119 In the 
vast majority of these cases, an industry trade association is used to 
run the conspiracy.120 At the beginning of the twentieth century, firms 
 
 117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010). 
 118. Following an agreement between the chairmen of Sotheby‘s and Christie‘s, the CEOs of 
the two rival firms met and fixed commissions, among other cooperation. MASON, supra note 70, 
at 122–23, 133–34. 
 119. See Hay & Kelley, supra note 56, at 21 (indicating that there are many cases in which 
larger groups conspire). 
 120. Id. at 21 (―In seven out of eight [cartel] cases with more than fifteen firms in the 
conspiracy, a formal industry trade association was involved.‖). 
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in many industries formed trade associations ―to avoid ruinous 
competition‖ and increase prices.121 In some cases, firms in trade 
associations have sought to both increase market price and to cut 
wages to their workforce.122 
For many cartels, their illegal summits transpired after a 
legitimate meeting of their trade association. Examples are cartels in 
school milk,123 carbonless paper,124 citric acid,125 lysine,126 choline 
chloride,127 copper plumbing tubes,128 turbines,129 and other heavy 
equipment.130 The presence of a trade association can give the illusion 
of legitimacy to competitor meetings.131 The trade association provided 
 
 121. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 321 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1991) (citing ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 121, 82 (1914)); see WHITNEY, 
supra note 82, at 40 (―[E]arly trade associations were little more than permanent pools.‖). 
 122. See WHITNEY, supra note 82, at 78 (discussing the Institute of Carpet Manufacturers of 
America). 
 123. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 413, 429 n.44 (1996) (―In the Western Kentucky case, according to testimony by industry 
witnesses, the bid-rigging arrangements were hatched at meetings of the Western Kentucky 
Dairy Products Association, which were usually held in conjunction with or following meetings of 
the Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Commission.‖). 
 124. Harrington, supra note 59, at 75. (―In the carbonless paper cartel, general planning 
meetings were conducted under the cover of the meetings of the Association of European 
Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper.‖) (internal citation omitted). 
 125. See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 134–35 (2001) (discussing European 
Citric Acid Manufacturers‘ Association and the citric acid cartel); KURT EICHENWALD, THE 
INFORMANT 3 (2000) (discussing how the cartel had ―formed bogus industry associations as a 
cover for [its] illegal meetings‖). 
 126. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 220 (discussing the ―formation of a formal lysine association 
to facilitate the conspiracy‖). 
 127. Id. at 316 (discussing how a meeting between the manufacturers turned into an 
agreement ―to raise the North American price of choline chloride‖); Harrington, supra note 59, at 
75–76 (―With choline chloride, meetings were generally (though not exclusively) scheduled either 
before or after the meetings of the European Chemical Industry Council.‖) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 128. Harrington, supra note 59, at 76 (―Coordination with trade association meetings also 
took place with cartels in copper plumbing tubes.‖) (internal citation omitted). 
 129. Robert R. Faulkner, Eric R. Cheney, Gene A. Fisher & Wayne E. Baker, Crime by 
Committee: Conspirators and Company Men in the Illegal Electrical Industry Cartel, 1954–1959, 
41 CRIMINOLOGY 511, 530 (2003).  
 130. JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST 
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 315 (1962) (noting that cartel ―meetings were 
incidental to technical gatherings‖).  
 131. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 202 (―ADM proposed forming a world lysine association 
that would meet on a regular basis. The new association would collect and distribute mostly 
production and market-share information, much like the Corn Refiners Association did for the 
U.S. corn wet milling products (Tr. 1734–36). Wilson also suggested that, like the European 
Citric Acid Manufacturers‘ Association, the new association would provide a convenient cover for 
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the cover for the illegal meetings because it explained why competitors 
were disclosing monthly sales to a common central body132 and why 
rival executives and salespeople were gathering together.133 In sum, 
the trade association provides the structure for cartel decisionmaking, 
the cover for why competitors are gathering, and ―may also foster a 
social climate conducive to collusion.‖134 All of this facilitates a 
relatively democratic decisionmaking process for the cartel. 
Of course, not all trade associations are fronts for illegal 
activity. Most engage in useful activities.135 Legitimate trade 
associations generally employ relatively democratic processes. They 
engage in rulemaking and standard setting in a relatively open 
fashion.136 This may in some cases, however, provide a forum for price 
fixing or market division. 
Cartels may assume the democratic decisionmaking structure 
of their corresponding trade association. In more participatory cartels, 
the monitoring and enforcement processes are done relatively 
collectively, with much involvement and discussion among the cartel 
members. For example, some cartels had twenty-five face-to-face 
meetings among their conspirators before being discovered and 
prosecuted.137 Many cartels had face-to-face meetings every month or 
 
illegal price-fixing discussions (Tr. 2186). In a year or two, a lysine association in fact emerged 
that met quarterly and performed the two functions that Wilson proposed.‖). 
 132. EICHENWALD, supra note 125, at 205 (―That‘s where the scheme came in. No one would 
question why each company had collected monthly sales data if it was turned over to the 
association. Then secretly, the companies could swap the numbers among themselves to enforce 
the volume agreement.‖). 
 133. Harrington, supra note 59, at 76 (―Scheduling to convene the cartel at a trade 
association meeting is obviously convenient—as many of the executives are to be there anyway—
but it also serves the purposes of avoiding detection of the cartel. The trade association meeting 
provides a cover for why executives of competing firms are all at the same venue.‖). 
 134. Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An 
Empirical Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 39 (1977). 
 135. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 233–34 
(2000) (―Routine activities include publications containing useful general information about the 
industry and about technological and governmental developments affecting it, lobbying 
activities, standard setting, safety and other ‗seal of approval‘ programs, providing media for 
arbitration, intra-industry promotion and advertising, and the publication of industry 
statistics.‖). 
 136. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 137 
(2005) (stating that trade associations ―also engage in rule making and standard setting for their 
industries‖ and that ―the great majority of trade associations‘ activities are procompetitive‖). 
 137. See CONNOR, supra note 125, at 135 (―There were about 25 face-to-face meetings of the 
[citric acid cartel] and about a dozen bilateral meetings (Tr. 2614–2801).‖); HERLING, supra note 
130, at 315 (discussing one of the heavy equipment cartels). 
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quarterly.138 The members of the Linseed cartel had to attend monthly 
meetings and were fined if they missed one.139 Some cartels, such as 
the district heating pipes cartel, had to increase the frequency of their 
meetings when the need to allocate new customers and new projects 
necessitated more group decisions.140 Similarly, the turbine cartel had 
to meet more frequently when it had more data to process.141 Scholars 
have theorized that economic turbulence could necessitate more cartel 
meetings because ―frequent negotiations among colluders are 
necessary when market conditions are unstable and uncertain.‖142 In 
addition to face-to-face meetings, cartels have used weekly phone calls 
and faxes to exchange information such as sales data.143 Because 
cartels make a multitude of decisions that need regular renegotiation 
and firms must monitor their cartel partners, frequent communication 
is necessary.144 In democratic cartels, the member firms discuss price 
openly and come to agreement following discussion.145 When done on 
the heels of a legitimate meeting, the administrative structure of the 
illegal cartel could take advantage of the previous decisionmaking 
rules of trade association meeting. 
Some cartels develop sophisticated managerial structures that 
lend themselves to organizational charts. For example, some cartels 
maintained an all-inclusive, worldwide group while forming regional 
subgroups.146 In one case, ―[t]he switchgear conspiracy was organized 
in a decentralized fashion. . . . [The] general managers set price-fixing 
 
 138. See HERLING, supra note 130, at 104 (noting one heavy equipment cartel whose working 
group ―met on an average of once every six to eight weeks‖); Harrington, supra note 59, at 55 
(―The lysine, zinc phosphate, and citric acid cartels monitored on a regular monthly basis.‖); id. 
(―In the case of the vitamin B5 cartel, firms initially reported sales data on a quarterly basis but 
later chose to do it on a monthly basis.‖). 
 139. BENJAMIN S. KIRSH, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN LAW AND BUSINESS 113–14 (1938). 
 140. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 74–75 (discussing how meetings to implement an 
allocation of sales quotas have ―a frequency dictated by the flow of new projects and customers‖). 
 141. Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 840–41. 
 142. Id. at 841. 
 143. Harrington, supra note 59, at 75 (―Most cartels exchanged information—generally 
regarding sales—on a monthly or quarterly basis with some doing it as often as weekly through 
phone or fax rather than face-to-face meetings.‖); Id. at 55 (―While the vitamins A and E cartel 
met monthly for monitoring purposes, they communicated weekly by phone.‖). 
 144. See id. at 81 (―To implement such a complex arrangement, some cartels created an 
impressive organizational structure that entailed frequent communication and face-to-face 
meetings.‖). 
 145. See, e.g., HERLING, supra note 130, at 33 (discussing the heavy electrical manufacturing 
cartel). 
 146. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 77 (―Other cartels organized themselves into both a 
general group—comprised of all cartel members—and regional sub-groups.‖). 
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policy and delegated execution of the details to a ‗working-level‘ group 
of subordinates.‖147 Similarly, the graphite electrodes ―cartel was 
organized into a ‗top-level‘ group and a ‗working-level‘ group. The top-
level meetings included primarily company presidents and managing 
directors and were designed to set policies. Lower-level managers, who 
met more frequently, worked out the details of the agreement and its 
implementation.‖148 
2. More Centralized Cartel Decisionmaking Structures 
On the other end of the spectrum are cartels that are not 
democratic in the sense that the members have ceded decisionmaking 
authority on prices, output, and/or customer allocation to another 
entity. ―Democratic‖ cartels, in which each cartel member has a voice 
in daily administration, can in fact be quite unwieldy.149 Cartel 
stability often requires that the managerial role be given to one or two 
ringleaders or an organization with centralized decisionmaking 
authority.150 Such an organizational form can reduce the agency costs 
of cartel management by controlling the diverse preferences of 
individual cartel members.151 
 
 147. Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 839. 
 148. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 833. 
 149. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1a; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. 
HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 121–28 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing 
some of the ―real-world complications associated with collusion‖); see also Nicolas de Roos, 
Examining Models of Collusion: The Market for Lysine, 24 INT‘L J. INDUS. ORG. 1083 (2006); 
Dick, supra note 94; Harrington, supra note 59; Hay & Kelley, supra note 56; Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve 
Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 238–40 (1986) (describing the role of the cartel ―ringmaster‖); 
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453 
(2006) [hereinafter Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty]; Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs and 
Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621 (2008) [hereinafter Leslie, 
Cartels]; Leslie, supra note 73; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking up Is 
Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming Sept. 2010) (―Cartels 
respond to imperfect or noisy information by trying to . . . better align individual firm incentives 
with those of the group‖ which would reduce agency costs); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52.  
 150. See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relational Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECON. 39, 70 (2002) (concluding that ―vertical integration is an 
efficient response‖); Mattias Ganslandt, Lars Persson & Helder Vosconcelos, Asymmetric Cartels 
– A Theory of Ring Leaders 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol‘y Research, Discussion Paper No. 6829, 2008), 
available at http://www.porto.ucp.pt/feg/docentes/hvasconcelos/docs/CEPR-DP6829.pdf 
(discussing ―why so many cartels have a ringleader and why the leading firm is so frequently 
substantially larger than other firms in a collusive market‖).  
 151. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (discussing 
how ―agency costs‖ arise when a principal cannot fully control his agents); Stewart E. 
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Another consideration is the problem of detection and 
prosecution. Day-to-day management of a cartel typically requires 
ongoing communication among the cartel members. The more such 
communication is needed, the more the cartel is likely to be detected. 
Today, communications among members constitute one of the primary 
types of evidence used to prove agreement in collusion cases.152 
Communications among competitors necessarily involve a certain 
amount of antitrust scrutiny, even though many of them are 
competitively beneficial. These facts explain why dealer cartels have 
often tried to engage a manufacturer in their scheme and have it 
impose behavior such as resale-price maintenance or territorial 
division among them. Communications between a manufacturer and 
its dealers are routine and common, and today are much less likely to 
invoke antitrust scrutiny. Furthermore, cartels may prefer the 
centralized model because it reduces the number of witnesses with 
pertinent information about the details of the cartel‘s operations.153 
For all of these reasons, the cartel may function better if it does 
not permit day-to-day pricing and output decisions to be made by a 
vote among members, but rather delegates that function to someone 
else. A corporate board or manager may be an ideal vehicle because, 
as a matter of corporate function, its goal is to maximize the value of 
the corporation, which it ordinarily does by maximizing profits. That 
is, assuming that the profits of the corporation are a good surrogate 
for the joint profits of the cartel members, maximization of the 
corporation‘s value will occur when the cartel maximizes its profits. 
This does not necessarily require that the cartel manager and the 
cartel operate in precisely the same market. For example, an exclusive 
joint selling agency, which is a popular cartel vehicle, might receive as 
its compensation a percentage of the individual members‘ profits. In 
that case, assuming that this formula was properly developed, the 
agency would maximize its profits by maximizing the aggregate 
profits of the individual members, which would coincide with the 
 
Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2763 (2006) 
(discussing how a ―trust protector‖ has ―the potential to serve as a monitor of the trustee‘s 
performance, reducing agency costs‖). 
 152. E.g., William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 
425 (2007) (―What is decisive in these cases is noneconomic evidence of the cause, particularly 
involving communications.‖); William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging 
Definition of Concerted Action under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
439 (2009). 
 153. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 855 (―In a decentralized network, however, 
there is no periphery. Many eyewitnesses to activities of numerous conspirators can be obtained, 
resulting in a much higher conviction rate, as in the switchgear and transformers conspiracies.‖). 
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cartel‘s profit-maximizing price.154 In that way, corporate management 
can act as a cartel facilitator in much the same way that a 
manufacturer can act as a cartel facilitator in some schemes involving 
vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance or territorial 
division, which limit competition among dealers.155 Importantly, 
however, once such a structure is in place, daily administration of the 
cartel may not require the active participation of cartel members at 
all. Indeed, to the extent that their individual interests in profit 
maximization differ from those of the cartel, individual participation 
may serve to hinder rather than further the cartel‘s goals. 
Most cartel structures have not been that extreme. What they 
share in common, however, is the transfer of daily authority from the 
cartel‘s members as a group to some much smaller subset, or else to a 
third-party organization that has the power to control the cartel 
members‘ individual output and prices. This Section discusses the 
various ways that some cartels centralize decisionmaking. First, a 
cartel might adopt a ringleader model. A ringleader is a firm that 
takes the lead in decisionmaking, such as pricing and market 
allocation, as well as enforcement actions by the cartel. For example, 
in the lysine cartel, as the largest producers, ADM and Ajinomoto 
seem to have played a greater role than their Korean counterparts in 
determining price and market allocation. The ringleader-as-enforcer 
model is illustrated by OPEC. For some decisions, OPEC is run 
relatively democratically, but Saudi Arabia clearly plays a dominant 
role. During major periods of the OPEC cartel, Saudi Arabia has 
played the role of cartel enforcer, deciding which violations of the 
cartel agreement to punish through punitive pricing and which 
deviations to allow by cutting back its own production in order to 
maintain the cartel price.156 Similarly, Philip Morris may have played 
a ringleader role in the tobacco cartel, enforcing agreements through 
price wars.157 While enjoying more control, cartel ringleaders also put 
themselves at risk of being prosecuted because their role in the 
 
 154. A commission based on sales volume or amount would not work, for that might induce 
the manager to charge a competitive price or even a below-cost price. 
 155. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). For a discussion on 
the massive retail druggists cartel that occasioned the resale price maintenance scheme in Dr. 
Miles, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 136, at 184–91; HOVENKAMP, supra note 121, at 331–47.  
 156. James M. Griffin & Weiwen Xiong, The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of 
OPEC, 40 J.L. & ECON. 289, 306 (1997) (―Historically, Saudi Arabia has played key roles in 
effectuating OPEC pricing strategies.‖). 
 157. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 
325–28 (2010). 
3b. Hovenkamp_Leslie_Page.doc 4/27/2011 11:58 AM 
844 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:3:813 
conspiracy is most clear.158 Furthermore, although the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division grants amnesty from criminal prosecution 
for the first member of a price-fixing conspiracy to expose the cartel to 
the government, amnesty is not available to the instigator or 
ringleader of a cartel.159 
Second, a cartel may make decisions by a committee composed 
of a subset of cartel members. For example, one of the earliest cartel 
cases to reach the Supreme Court160 involved a cartel by committee. In 
this cartel, which involved cast iron pipe, the cartel members assigned 
territories to each other but also created a governing structure for 
remaining territories ―whereby all offers to purchase pipe were 
submitted to a committee which set the price and awarded the 
contract to the manufacturer that agreed to pay the largest bonus to 
be divided among the others.‖161 The cartel members relinquished 
their independent power to set prices to the committee, which sought 
to maximize the collective revenue of the co-conspirators. 
Third, some cartels locate decisionmaking power in a single 
entity, which is itself typically not a producer in the cartelized market. 
A common example is a joint sales agent. Under this model, all the 
members of a cartel agree to have a common sales agency make all 
sales. Exclusivity is usually critical because otherwise the cartel 
members would be able to avoid the cartel output limitations by 
making unlimited numbers of ―outside‖ sales, driving price back down 
to the competitive level. 
Exclusivity is a critical signpost for distinguishing competitive 
from anticompetitive joint selling. For example, nonexclusivity has 
saved joint selling ventures from antitrust liability. In Broadcast 
Music, Inc., the defendant offered a blanket license for recorded music 
to radio stations and other broadcasters.162 The blanket license was 
formed when thousands of individual copyright holders gave BMI 
nonexclusive licenses to play their music for profit. Cartel output 
 
 158. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 855 (―[A] lower conviction rate is found in a 
centralized network because only the core ‗ringleaders‘ can be successfully prosecuted.‖). 
 159. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM pt. A6 (1993), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm; see also Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra 
note 149 (advocating making ringleaders eligible for amnesty because this would destabilize 
cartels by making ringleaders less trustworthy). 
 160. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899). 
 161. Greene v. Gen. Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 647 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing Addyston 
Pipe). 
 162. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
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reduction was highly unlikely because each individual cartel member 
had the unlimited power to ―cheat‖ on the cartel by making unlimited 
numbers of noncartel sales. The Supreme Court rejected per se 
condemnation, and the Second Circuit upheld the BMI blanket license 
under the rule of reason. Nonexclusivity is not, however, dispositive. 
In Maricopa, the Court condemned as unlawful per se a nonexclusive 
agreement among physicians to market their medical services jointly 
at advertised maximum prices.163 Nevertheless, courts have frequently 
cited exclusivity or its absence in determining the legality of joint 
selling or similar horizontal arrangements.164 
The most significant aspect of the exclusive joint sales agent is 
that it ―removes individual firm discretion over pricing decisions.‖165 A 
common sales agent employed by a cartel sets price and other contract 
terms, allocates customers, and arranges sales.166 The cartel member 
may do little more than manufacture and ship the product. 
The use of an exclusive joint sales agent by cartels is relatively 
common.167 The use of a joint sales agent helped stabilize the Chilean 
nitrate168 and international nitrogenous fertilizer cartels.169 Joint sales 
agencies were also employed by the cartels in bromine, cement, 
 
 163. Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc‘y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 164. See, e.g., Nat‘l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 594 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (refusing to condemn a merchant interchange fee being challenged that applied only 
when the merchant's bank and the card issuer's bank facilitated their transaction through Visa's 
own interconnection system, called BASE II; ―[s]ignificantly, the parties to the interchange are 
not required to use BASE II. Merchant and issuer institutions are free to negotiate a different 
rate and bypass the BASE II system entirely‖); cf. Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
259 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (condemning an interchange fee found to be exclusive, and 
distinguishing NaBanco). See generally 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 2001 (discussing the 
requirement of exclusivity for anticompetitive horizontal agreements); id. ¶ 2104 (discussing the 
significance of joint venture exclusivity). 
 165. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69. 
 166. Dick, supra note 94, at 273 (―Cartels that were organized as common sales agencies 
centralized exporting logistics by negotiating prices and terms of sale, assigning orders to 
member firms, bargaining with shippers over freight and insurance rates, and collecting 
remittances.‖). 
 167. Id. at 246–47 (―Four-fifths of the cartels set a common price and/or allocated markets, 
and slightly more than one-half centralized export distribution through a common sales 
agency.‖); see also 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 2132 (discussing how those participating in a 
market will necessarily have to agree about many things, some of which can be regarded as 
price-affecting or output-limiting, such as jointly made pricing rules and joint selling).  
 168. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 152–53 (1946). 
 169. Id. at 146–47. 
3b. Hovenkamp_Leslie_Page.doc 4/27/2011 11:58 AM 
846 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:3:813 
diamonds, ocean shipping, oil, potash, and European steel, among 
others.170 
Perhaps the most famous example of an exclusive sales agent 
was Appalachian Coals.171 In that case a group of coal producers 
created an incorporated selling agency.172 Each producer then gave 
this firm the exclusive right to market its coal and to establish 
standard classifications for coal. The members even gave up individual 
discretion as to the price, permitting the company to sell it at the ―best 
prices obtainable.‖173 The consent of an individual producer on any 
transaction was required only if the delivery were to occur more than 
sixty days subsequent to the sale,174 probably to ensure that the 
producer would have the coal available. The Court ultimately 
approved the arrangement under the rule of reason,175 but it never 
doubted conspiratorial capacity notwithstanding that the individual 
producers had entirely taken themselves out of the conduct of daily 
business. 
Cartels pursue the joint exclusive sales agent model for a 
number of reasons. First, vesting power within a single sales agent 
eliminates many of the coordination impasses that may otherwise 
occur. For example, the sales agent sets the price. There is no need to 
orchestrate price announcements. The price is uniform and moves 
simultaneously for all cartel participants through the sales agent‘s 
decisions. 
Second, making all sales through an exclusive sales agent 
reduces the risk of cartel-destabilizing cheating. Firms in a cartel 
cannot sell more than their allotment if all sales are made through the 
central office and cannot offer a lower price if the price is set by the 
common agent.176 The exclusive sales agent model solves the problem 
of distrust that can destabilize cartels because firms do not have to 
trust their cartel partners.177 Professors Margaret Levenstein and 
 
 170. See Leslie, supra note 73, at 621 (discussing other examples of cartels employing a joint 
sales agency); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 825–26 (noting cartel‘s use of a 
combination of joint sales agency and joint venture). 
 171. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
 172. On the relevance of the status of Appalachian Coals as a corporation independent of its 
coal producer constituents, see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763 
& n.7 (1984). 
 173. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 357–58. 
 174. Id. at 358. 
 175. See id. at 360. 
 176. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69 (noting that the joint sales agency 
―eliminates the possibility that individual firms will engage in secret cheating‖). 
 177. Leslie, supra note 73, at 621, 634. 
3b. Hovenkamp_Leslie_Page.doc 4/27/2011 11:58 AM 
2011] THE FIRM AS CARTEL MANAGER 847 
Valerie Suslow conclude that the joint sales agency is ―the strongest 
organizational form used to ‗monitor‘ output.‖178 In American Needle, 
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that cartels employ a single 
management structure in order to reduce the risk of cheating: ―Indeed, 
a joint venture with a single management structure is generally a 
better way to operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a party 
to an illegal agreement defecting from that agreement.‖179 
Significantly, the arrangement in American Needle was also exclusive. 
Each team assigned to NFLP the exclusive right to market its 
intellectual property.180 
Third, and most importantly, joint sales agencies strongly 
correlate with cartel success.181 In his study of export cartels organized 
under the Webb-Pomerene Act, Andrew Dick found that price-fixing 
cartels that employed ―common sales agencies tended to restrict 
exports and raise price.‖182 Further, ―cartels that organized as common 
sales agencies were longer-lived on average.‖183 For example, one of 
the most successful known examples is the international iodine cartel, 
which used a joint sales agent to conduct all sales to run a cartel for 
over sixty years.184 In short, the net effect of the joint sales agency is 
to stabilize a cartel.185 
The utility of common sales agents to further cartel interests is 
not lost on antitrust enforcers. Because the agreement among 
competitors to utilize a joint sales agent can stabilize a cartel, 
antitrust law generally prohibits such agreements as an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 
Some cartels present hybrids of these various mechanisms. For 
example, the diamond cartel used a joint sales agency—the Central 
Selling Office (―CSO‖)—in London to run the cartel, but DeBeers was 
 
 178. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69. 
 179. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010). 
 180. Id. at 2207 (noting that prior to 2000 the licenses had been nonexclusive, but in 
December of 2000 the teams authorized NFLP to grant exclusive licenses). 
 181. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69 (cartels that used joint sales agencies ―were 
among the more successful cartels‖). 
 182. Dick, supra note 94, at 256. 
 183. Id. at 275. 
 184. Robert S. Pindyck, The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 
154, 157 (1979). 
 185. Dick, supra note 94, at 241 (―Contracts in which the cartel centralized its control 
through a common sales agency tended to be more stable.‖); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, 
at 69 (―Cartels that control the distribution of goods, through a joint sales agency or some other 
mechanism, appear to be more stable.‖). 
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also clearly the ringleader of the cartel.186 In addition to the CSO, the 
diamond cartel set up a network of dealer clubs comprised of sight 
holders, manufacturers, wholesalers, and brokers.187 The subdivisions 
of the diamond cartel developed their own internal private arbitration 
mechanisms.188 The diamond cartel‘s contracts with its members 
contained price-fixing clauses and quotas.189 So, it was not a pure joint 
sales agent structure, but it contained this element. Cartels can 
fashion their own corporate structures to implement and police a 
price-fixing conspiracy, but Levenstein and Suslow argue ―that the 
more elaborate these sharing and monitoring mechanisms—or the 
closer they bring the cartel to a joint sales agency—the more stable 
the cartel.‖190 
III. CARTEL STRUCTURE AND THE SINGLE ENTITY QUESTION 
If the primary purpose of Section One is to deter and punish 
price-fixing cartels, then the single entity question should be 
considered in light of how cartels operate. This will assist courts in 
applying the Copperweld doctrine in light of American Needle. In other 
words, why do a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary 
constitute a single entity for antitrust purposes and the teams within 
the NFL do not? Studying cartel structure helps answer this question. 
Part III synthesizes the historical lessons of how cartels operate with 
the antitrust-agreement analysis of the American Needle decision. 
 
 186. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 53 (1994) (―It is generally understood, 
however, that DeBeers insists on being both the sole purchaser and the price setter and that the 
CSO is the sole distributor.‖); see also Bill Keller, DeBeers May Be Losing Grip on Diamond 
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1992, at A1. 
 187. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119 (1992). One mid-century report explained part of 
the corporate structure of the diamond cartel as follows: 
The diamond industry‘s marketing system, and DeBeers‘ dominant position in it, 
became fully established in the early 1930‘s with the creation of three new corporate 
entities—the Diamond Trading Corporation, Ltd., the Diamond Producers 
Association, Ltd., and the Diamond Trading Company, Ltd.—all controlled by 
DeBeers. The Diamond Corporation holds exclusive contracts for the purchase of the 
alluvial diamond production of Western and Central Africa. The Diamond Producers 
Association functions as the sole purchaser of South African diamonds. Both the 
Diamond Corporation and Diamond Producers Association sell their diamonds 
exclusively to the Diamond Trading Company, which is thus the single distributing 
agency for ninety-seven percent of the African diamond production. 
Note, The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALE L.J. 1404, 1407 (1947). 
 188. Bernstein, supra note 187, at 121. 
 189. Note, supra note 187, at 1408–09. 
 190. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 71. 
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A. Touchstones for Determining Single Entity Status 
Reading Copperweld and American Needle in combination 
leads to several principles on how to distinguish a single entity from a 
collection of actors who are capable of conspiring. 
1. Substance over Form 
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court established that ―substance, 
not form, should determine whether a[n] . . . entity is capable of 
conspiring under § 1.‖191 The Court held that in form a parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary are legally distinct entities, but in substance, 
for antitrust purposes, they represent one entity because their unified 
action does not ―deprive[ ] the marketplace of independent centers of 
decisionmaking.‖192 
The Court in American Needle again emphasized that it rejects 
―formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how 
the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually 
operate.‖193 This time, however, the Court analyzed the issue from a 
different perspective. While in Copperweld, the Court held that the 
presence of two legal entities did not necessarily constitute concerted 
action, in American Needle, the Court held that the deposit of 
decisionmaking power in ―a legally ‗single entity‘ ‖ did not necessarily 
prove the absence of concerted action.194 Legal descriptions are not 
determinative; instead, to determine whether an alleged combination 
constitutes concerted action, the key is ―whether it joins together 
separate decisionmakers.‖195 
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court noted 
that in form, the teams might appear to be a single entity—as the 
Seventh Circuit had held—because they ―organized and own a legally 
separate entity that centralizes the management of their intellectual 
property.‖196 In substance, however, the teams were separate and 
capable of conspiring because ―[e]ach of the teams is a substantial, 
independently owned, and independently managed business.‖197 More 
 
 191. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 n.21 (1984). 
 192. Id. at 769. 
 193. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010). 
 194. Id. at 2210 (―We have similarly looked past the form of a legally ‗single entity‘ when 
competitors were part of professional organizations or trade groups.‖). 
 195. Id. at 2212. 
 196. Id. at 2213. 
 197. Id. at 2212. 
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importantly, the teams were in competition with each other for ―fans, 
for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing 
personnel.‖198 
The emphasis of substance over form is critical when analyzing 
cartels. When cartels employ a centralized decisionmaking vehicle—
whether a trade association, a joint sales agent, or an incorporated 
management structure—it may appear that a single entity is in 
control or that all the relevant agreements are vertical rather than 
horizontal. For example, one could argue that firms employing a joint 
sales agent are not agreeing on price, because they do not discuss 
price at all; all price decisions are made by a single entity, the agent. 
But this argument is too simple. The ringleader model of centralized 
decisionmaking—in which competitors agree to allow one seller to 
serve as ringleader—is clearly an agreement (and an illegal one at 
that). From an antitrust standpoint, there is no difference between 
agreeing to abide by the ringleader‘s decisions and agreeing to cede 
decisionmaking authority to a separate entity that runs the cartel. 
Either way, an independent firm has agreed to not compete on price. 
For example, when DeBeers acts as a ringleader, there is clearly a 
cartel. When DeBeers sets up the Central Selling Office with a 
different name to run the cartel, it has the same anticompetitive effect 
and is not meaningfully distinguishable. Either way, there is an 
agreement. The more important question is not who controls, but 
rather how is the business of independent firms controlled by the 
central organization; that is, do the organization‘s operations have an 
impact on the price and output decisions of otherwise independent 
decisionmakers? 
It is also important not to be sidetracked by the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical agreements. While horizontal 
agreements are treated with considerable hostility by the antitrust 
laws, vertical agreements are nearly always addressed under the rule 
of reason and most are legal. This includes resale price maintenance, 
nonprice restraints, exclusive dealing, and vertical boycotts.199 When 
each firm in a group gives a sales agent an exclusive right to sell their 
produce, the form of the arrangement looks like a series of vertical 
agreements. Of course, there may have been a horizontal agreement to 
use an exclusive sale agency, but there may not have been an express 
agreement, or that agreement may be sufficiently surreptitious that it 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (purely vertical boycott to be 
governed under rule of reason). 
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cannot be proven. And indeed, not every exclusive sales agency 
agreement is a cartel. For example, an artist who hangs her painting 
in a consignment gallery may be giving the gallery an exclusive right 
to sell her painting for the consignment period. If twenty different 
artists do the same thing they are certainly agreeing individually with 
the gallery, but they are not agreeing with each other and may not 
even be aware of one another‘s existence. 
Price-fixing firms may go to great lengths to make their 
schemes appear to be the product of a single entity‘s decisionmaking 
or of purely vertical agreements. For example, in some historical 
cases, the member firms structured their cartels so that ―the common 
sales agency actually took title to the product, as would a merchant 
wholesaler.‖200 In that case the form of the agreement would be a set 
of sales from each cartel member individually to the facilitator, as in a 
supplier-dealer relationship. Each of the agreements considered 
individually would be vertical. 
It would be foolish for antitrust law to hold that competitors‘ 
use of a joint sales agent—or any other single entity—renders them 
immune from Section One scrutiny. Section One is primarily geared at 
prohibiting, deterring, and punishing price-fixing cartels. Although 
cartels are inherently unstable, they can be stabilized through the use 
of a joint sales agent. That is, being misled by the single entity or 
purely vertical characterization would effectively remove from 
antitrust review a class of cartel arrangements that are in fact among 
the most stable, and thus the most harmful to consumers. As the 
Seventh Circuit explained in one cartel case, ―almost any market can 
be cartelized if the law permits sellers to establish formal, overt 
mechanisms for colluding, such as exclusive sales agencies.‖201 In 
short, agreeing to create an exclusionary structure—whether a joint 
sales agent or ringleader—is an agreement that is subject to antitrust 
scrutiny. 
2. The Necessity of Coordination 
In concluding that the NFL and its teams were a single entity, 
the Seventh Circuit in its American Needle opinion focused on the 
presence of ―common interests.‖ For example, the court emphasized 
that ―the NFL teams share a vital economic interest in collectively 
 
 200. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 27. 
 201. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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promoting NFL football.‖202 The Seventh Circuit then stressed the 
necessity of cooperation in sports leagues, noting that that ―the 
product that the teams produce jointly—NFL football—requires 
extensive coordination and integration between the teams.‖203 
This presents two related issues—that the actors have common 
interests and that coordination is necessary for them to achieve these 
common interests. The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit‘s 
reasoning on both. First, the Court held that the presence of common 
interests does not convert a joint effort into a single entity because the 
NFL teams ―are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their 
interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.‖204 
Second, the American Needle Court held that simply because 
coordination among team owners is necessary to provide the product, 
that does not mean that necessity of cooperation transforms concerted action into 
independent action; a nut and a bolt can only operate together, but an agreement 
between nut and bolt manufacturers is still subject to § 1 analysis. Nor does it mean 
that once a group of firms agree to produce a joint product, cooperation amongst those 
firms must be treated as independent conduct. The mere fact that the teams operate 
jointly in some sense does not mean that they are immune.205 
Ultimately, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the reason why the 
firms are cooperating does not help answer the question whether the 
firms are capable of conspiring.206 
The Court‘s holdings are appropriate given the economics of 
cartelization. The presence of common interests cannot be a basis for 
finding a collaboration to be a single entity since rival firms form 
cartels because it is in their common interest to reduce output and 
increase price. But it is these effects that warrant condemnation of 
cartels. Moreover, all illegal agreements are likely to be in the 
common interests of the conspirators; otherwise they would not 
agree.207 Furthermore, the need for cooperation cannot be dispositive. 
 
 202. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); 
see also Int‘l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1397 (8th Cir. 1993) (jury instruction 
stated: ―Where the entities possess an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose, they are 
not separate entities capable of conspiring‖). 
 203. 538 F.3d at 737, rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 204. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–61; Zenichi 
Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 69–81 (1987)). 
 205. Id. at 2214. 
 206. Id. (―The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is 
concerted or independent action.‖). 
 207. Id. at 2213 (―But illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to 
the restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.‖). 
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As explained in Part II, price-fixing schemes require an enormous 
amount of cooperation and coordination to create and maintain a 
stable cartel. Antitrust law should disrupt these coordination efforts, 
not reward them through Copperweld immunity. 
The necessity of cooperation is, nevertheless, important for 
Section One analysis. If restraints on competition are necessary to 
produce the product at issue, then the agreement will be evaluated 
under the rule of reason, instead of condemned under the per se 
rule.208 This, however, provides no breathing room for naked price 
fixing, which is per se illegal. However, the presence of common 
interests and the need for coordination cannot convert separate actors 
into a single entity for antitrust purposes. 
3. The Nature and Direction of Control 
The decisions in Copperweld and American Needle also indicate 
that the nature and direction of control matters. Where does control 
reside? Who exercises control over whom? Most importantly, are 
persons with separate ownership or business interests placed under 
control? For example, Copperweld held that the parent corporation 
completely controlled its wholly owned subsidiary, which had no 
separate business. Similarly, sibling corporations that are each wholly 
owned subsidiaries of the same parent fall within Copperweld, and 
their agreements are generally immune from Section One liability. In 
Dagher the Supreme Court refused to find Section One liability over a 
joint venture that had taken on all of the production, refining, and 
marketing activities of its two parent firms.209 In that case the issue 
was not whether the joint venture was in ―control.‖ Clearly it was. 
Rather, the important fact was that, as in Copperweld, no independent 
interests remained to be controlled, since all of the parents‘ separate 
business activities had terminated and been merged into the 
venture.210 The Dagher Court distinguished a rule of reason 
application of Section One of the Sherman Act under the ancillary 
restraints doctrine. That doctrine, it pointed out, ―governs the validity 
of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such as 
a business association or joint venture, on nonventure activities.‖211 
 
 208. Id. at 2215 n.6 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 
(1984)). 
 209. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 210. See infra notes 262–269 and accompanying text. 
 211. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7. 
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That is to say, Section One would be invoked to the extent that the 
central organization sought to limit the participants‘ activities outside 
the venture, but it did not apply when there were no such outside 
activities to limit. 
In thinking of cartel control, it is important to distinguish 
cartel formation from cartel operation. Cartels are voluntary 
organizations. By and large firms are not forced to join.212 At the time 
a cartel is formed the individual members are clearly in control. 
Further, as a group they want the same thing: maximization of joint 
profits. Once the cartel is formed, however, incentives change. At that 
point each cartel member can profit by cheating, provided that the 
rest of the cartel hangs together. As a result, control flows in both 
directions. At the time of formation the members are in control in the 
sense that they voluntarily join and set up the cartel‘s structure. Once 
ongoing operations begin, however, cartel success depends on the 
ability of the cartel‘s administration to control the members‘ day-to-
day output and pricing behavior. 
American Needle is fairly typical. The individual teams 
participated in creating NFLP and assigned it their IP rights. 
Thereafter NFLP managed those rights, limiting the individual teams‘ 
ability to sell their IP rights separately. The fact that a single 
incorporated entity such as NFLP served a coordinating function did 
not make it a single entity for antitrust purposes. NFLP did not 
govern the teams the way that a parent corporation governs its wholly 
owned subsidiaries. Instead, the ―teams remain separately controlled, 
potential competitors with economic interests that are distinct from 
NFLP‘s financial well-being.‖213 In its briefs the NFL argued 
vehemently that the individual teams had little to no control over 
their own IP rights. Indeed, for the most part they did not even 
 
 212. Occasionally concerted refusals to deal and similar tactics are used to coerce firms into 
joining a cartel, but these are themselves actionable under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Rossi v. 
Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 1998) (members of roofing cartel conspired to 
deny price cutter access to materials); Denny‘s Marina v. Renfro Prods., 8 F.3d 1217, 1219–20 
(7th Cir. 1993) (defendant boat sellers conspired to deny price cutting seller access to annual 
boat show). This was also a fair reading of the claim in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 770–78 (1993), namely, that the defendant insurers were involved in a cartel to 
limit coverage and conspired with the Insurance Services Office to deny loss data and with 
Lloyds and others to deny reinsurance to insurers who were unwilling to join the cartel. See 
generally 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 2201 (discussing several cases in which concerted 
refusal to deal with respect to one transaction in order to get the target to change its behavior 
with respect to another and unrelated transaction was subject to legal action under antitrust 
laws). 
 213. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–61). 
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develop them. Rather, the league itself assigned the teams its official 
colors and ―takes the lead in developing and registering the marks of 
any new member club.‖214 No team could change its name, marks, or 
logo without NFLP‘s consent.215 But the Court‘s decision turned on the 
way that the League controlled business activities that the individual 
member teams could otherwise have engaged in separately. 
When one entity absolutely controls all aspects of the business 
of multiple other entities owned by the parent, as in Copperweld, there 
is one entity for antitrust purposes. When a single entity is set up by 
the participants in order to control their actual or potentially separate 
business interests, as in American Needle, then there are multiple 
entities capable of conspiring for antitrust purposes. This is true 
whether that dependent entity is a joint venture, a trade association, 
or a joint sales agent, and also whether or not the controlling entity is 
a corporation, as NFLP was. Suppose two separate firms create a joint 
venture and each owns half. Depending on how it is structured and 
presented, a joint venture may appear to be single entity with its own 
name, logo, product, etc. However, for antitrust purposes, the joint 
venture is a product of concerted action, and actions by the venture 
management that limit the separate business of each firm are 
conspiratorial to the extent they limit competition that could 
otherwise have occurred. Control can certainly be an indicator of 
conspiratorial capacity. In American Needle, the Supreme Court cited 
Sealy and several other decisions as involving situations where ―the 
entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, 
as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.‖216 The Supreme Court paid 
scant attention to questions about how decisionmaking within the 
NFL is made or the extent to which the individual teams participated 
in the decision to grant Reebok an exclusive license. Rather, the fact 
was that the exclusive licensing decision limited the abilities of the 
individual teams to market their IP rights separately.217 
 
 214. Brief for the NFL Respondents at *7, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) 
(No. 08–661), 2009 WL 3865438. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209 (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)). 
On Sealy, see infra the discussion accompanying notes 222–42. See also Nw. Wholesale 
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 26 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass‘n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
 217. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (―The NFL respondents may be similar in some sense to 
a single enterprise that owns several pieces of intellectual property and licenses them jointly, but 
they are not similar in the relevant functional sense. Although NFL teams have common 
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4. Ability to Withdraw 
The Supreme Court cases also suggest that another metric for 
determining single entity status is looking at withdrawal status. In 
other words, can the members of a centralized body withdraw from the 
structure? If not, it is more likely to be a single entity. If the members 
can withdraw, however, then that suggests that they are independent 
decisionmakers capable of conspiring. The Court in American Needle 
noted, after explaining the collective intellectual property licensing 
arrangement through NFLP, that the individual NFL teams ―are able 
to and have at times sought to withdraw from this arrangement.‖218 
The Copperweld opinion shows that a parent corporation and its 
wholly owned subsidiary constitute a single entity for antitrust 
purposes because the subsidiary is not independent since it cannot, on 
its own accord, exit the relationship. In contrast, the independence of 
the teams of a sports league is illustrated in part by their ability to 
unilaterally withdraw from the enterprise. 
A cartel may create a joint sales agency apparently vested with 
the power to set and impose its will on member firms, who may claim 
that they are controlled by the central body, not independent 
decisionmakers, and therefore entitled to Copperweld immunity. This 
argument is weakened by the fact that members can withdraw from 
the cartel arrangement. All individual firms have the ability to depart 
the cartel and to compete on the merits. This power to withdraw is 
what each firm threatens to exercise during the cartel creation and 
renegotiation process in order to maximize its take of the cartel‘s 
profits. 
The presence of a centralized cartel enforcer does not affect the 
single entity analysis. Even when the agreement creates a single 
decisionmaker, this entity‘s creation is the result of the collective 
decision of separate decisionmakers. The resulting body does not 
possess true control; rather the constituent parts have ceded 
temporary control for limited purposes. We know that the control is 
not real because each cartel member can withdraw from an 
arrangement and regain the control that it temporarily relinquished 
to the cartel. Furthermore, the fact that the cartel members do not 
directly fix the actual price is beside the point; they agreed to create 
the structure that controls the price. Each firm could reassert control 
 
interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, 
and their interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.‖). 
 218. Id. at 2207. 
3b. Hovenkamp_Leslie_Page.doc 4/27/2011 11:58 AM 
2011] THE FIRM AS CARTEL MANAGER 857 
over price by exiting the arrangement. Although it might seem that 
the firm may be contractually bound to the joint sales agency, any 
such contract would be void because it violates Section One.219 
5. Relevance of Corporate Form 
As the Supreme Court has made clear, corporate form is not 
decisive of the conspiratorial capacity issue.220 It may, however, still 
be relevant. Copperweld found a single entity notwithstanding that 
the challenged ―agreement‖ was between two separate corporations. 
American Needle found conspiratorial capacity even though the 
licensor was a single corporation. Corporate control is relevant, but 
the identity of the entities that a corporation controls is also relevant. 
For example, if a group of rivals organizes a corporation and then 
manages it so as to limit their independent business interests, 
conspiratorial capacity is present. The Supreme Court assumed this in 
Appalachian Coals and explicitly recognized it in Sealy and Topco. 
But consider a different structure. A group of independent 
mattress manufacturers, wishing to produce under a common name, 
sponsor the launch of an IPO. The resulting company is owned ninety 
percent by a typical miscellany of investors and ten percent by the 
manufacturers. The manufacturers do not get a member on the board 
of directors and have no say in the daily operations of the firm. 
However, the firm has the power to control the individual business 
decisions pertaining to sales location, production, and pricing. The 
directors, as any board, are charged with maximizing the value of the 
business. They do this by imposing restrictions that limit the output of 
the individual manufacturers or force them to charge a particular 
price. 
In this case, the firms have organized themselves as a managed 
cartel. The fact that they have no formal ―control‖ in the day-to-day 
operations of the corporation and do not even have a presence on the 
board of directors is no more relevant than the Copperweld facts that 
the parent and subsidiary were separately incorporated. Just as the 
 
 219. See Citizen Publ‘g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134–36 (1969) (holding that 
agreement between the only two newspapers in the county to jointly set their subscription and 
advertising rates, pool their profits, and refrain from engaging in business that competed with 
the newspapers was illegal for violating Section One); Spitzer v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 
2d 399, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that agreement between hospitals to fix rates, terms and 
conditions for services and allocating markets violated Section One); Leslie, supra note 73, at 
645–46 (discussing how those wishing to withdraw from price-fixing conspiracies should confess 
so as to avoid antitrust liability still attached to the agreement) . 
 220. See supra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
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Appalachian Coals corporation was formed for the purpose of selling 
coal at the best price it could obtain, the directors of our hypothetical 
corporation are required to maximize their corporation‘s value, which 
corporate law obligates them to do. Clearly, decisions about the price 
and output of plants owned and operated by the corporation itself are 
unilateral. However, if the corporation acts by imposing restrictions on 
the separately owned business of the individual manufacturers, the 
conduct is no longer unilateral. The issue has nothing to do with 
formal or even informal control of the corporation, but with the fact 
that the corporation is controlling the separate businesses of these 
shareholders. 
The situation somewhat resembles a manufacturer‘s control of 
the business of its independent dealers. For example, a firm such as 
General Motors (―GM‖) has franchise relationships with numerous 
dealers. Many of these dealers may be GM shareholders, and it is 
conceivable that in GM, or some other franchise, certain individual 
franchisees or franchisee groups are major or even controlling 
shareholders. None of these ownership facts changes GM from a single 
firm to a cartel. However, as soon as GM imposes restrictions on a 
franchised dealer‘s separate business, by restricting its location or 
setting its resale prices, imposing exclusivity or exclusive dealing 
clauses, or either tying goods sold to the dealer or requiring the dealer 
to tie in its own sales, the conduct is multilateral and reachable under 
Section One. Whether or not that particular dealer owns any GM 
shares is irrelevant. Nor is it relevant whether the dealer whose 
business is subject to this limitation is in any way in control. The only 
relevant question is whether GM is controlling the dealer‘s separate 
business. 
Antitrust law characterizes these restraints as vertical and for 
the most part subjects them to lenient treatment. However, it 
uniformly characterizes the conduct as collaborative rather than 
unilateral, even if the relationship between firms, such as franchisor 
and franchisee, is so complete that the franchisees are effectively 
operating as a subsidiary. The Supreme Court has recognized 
exceptions for certain situations where a cartel of dealers ―controls‖ 
the parent firm‘s conduct, but we would not be speaking of corporate 
control through shareholder voting or director or manager dominance. 
Rather, we would be speaking of contractual control.221 Beyond that, 
 
 221. Under the Supreme Court‘s Leegin decision, which adopted a rule of reason for resale 
price maintenance, a horizontal agreement among dealers in a single brand to fix prices could be 
treated under the per se rule, while a vertical agreement between a supplier and its dealers 
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the agreements would be treated under the rule of reason as 
multilateral activity, just the way the Supreme Court treated the 
restraint in that case.222 
B. Case Studies 
Cartels have several options for how to structure their 
decisionmaking processes. The fact that some cartels choose a 
centralized cartel model does not convert a cartel into a single entity. 
A joint venture, cooperative, trade association, or joint sales agent 
might appear to be a single entity, but it is not for antitrust purposes 
when it is the instrument of independent actors. Understanding how 
cartels operate helps apply American Needle in a fashion that protects 
actual single entities from inappropriate antitrust liability while 
ensuring that concerted action does not escape scrutiny. 
In order to show how the factors described above can help 
courts distinguish between concerted action and conduct by a single 
entity, this Section applies the factors to joint ventures, past and 
present, that raise antitrust concerns. Even if antitrust defendants in 
these cases do not seem to represent a classic price-fixing cartel, 
antitrust law should not be interpreted to render them a ―single 
entity‖ for antitrust purposes because this could have implications for 
later cases involving an actual cartel. 
1. Sealy and Topco 
The American Needle opinion quoted and cited liberally from 
two prior Supreme Court cases, Copperweld and Sealy. The 
invocations of Copperweld are hardly surprising given that American 
Needle was essentially a case about the application and limits of 
Copperweld immunity. In contrast, the reliance on Sealy was less 
 
facilitating such a cartel would be treated under the rule of reason. Both, however, would be 
treated as collaborative activity. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 893 (2007) (―A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that 
decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per 
se unlawful . . . . To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered 
upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of 
reason.‖) (citations omitted); see also Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 
F.3d 204, 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (relying on this passage to deny summary judgment on 
complaint that a truck manufacturer maintained resale prices at the behest of a cartel of its 
dealers). 
 222. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (finding conspiratorial capacity and remanding for 
consideration of the restraint under the rule of reason). 
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expected. In Sealy, the government challenged Sealy‘s policy of 
granting exclusive territories to its licensees who manufactured Sealy-
brand mattresses.223 The government argued that, because the 
licensees controlled the Sealy Board of Directors, the arrangement 
constituted horizontal market division, which is per se illegal.224 Sealy 
argued that it was in a vertical relationship with its licensees and that 
its policy should be evaluated under the more lenient rule of reason.225 
The Court sided with the government.226 
On its face, the Sealy opinion seems unrelated to the single 
entity question.227 Indeed, the Copperweld opinion never mentions 
Sealy. Yet the American Needle Court found Sealy instructive. 
Because Sealy predated Copperweld, it was decided at a time when 
antitrust law permitted findings of conspiracy between a parent and a 
subsidiary, at least for some purposes.228 So the single entity question 
was not explicitly litigated in Sealy. Indeed, instead of arguing that 
Sealy and its licensees constituted a single entity, Sealy argued that 
―the evidence shows that Sealy has been operated as a separate entity, 
in its own interest, and not in the private interests of its licensees‖229 
and that ―evidence showing the scrupulously maintained separation 
between Sealy‘s corporate interests and the individual interests of its 
licensees precludes the conclusion that Sealy and its licensees are not 
separate entities.‖230 The closest that Sealy came to making a single 
entity argument was its suggestion that Sealy‘s arrangement should 
get the same deference as Simmons, an integrated firm not subject to 
Section One scrutiny because it was a single entity.231 
 
 223. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008) (questioning the value of the Sealy horizontal versus 
vertical debate). 
 227. The primary holdings of Sealy are that horizontal territorial allocation schemes are per 
se illegal and that apparently vertical restraints may, in reality, be horizontal restraints when 
horizontal actors control the vertical relationship. 
 228. On such findings prior to Copperweld, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶ 
1463 (discussing Supreme Court intraenterprise cases from Yellow Cab to Copperweld). 
 229. Brief for Appellee, Sealy, Inc. at 6, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 
9), 1966 WL 100609 [hereinafter Sealy Respondent Brief]; see also id. at 21 (―Sealy‘s separate 
existence as a profitable enterprise operated for its overall best interests, and not as a mere 
instrumentality or creature of its licensees.‖). 
 230. Id. at 31. 
 231. Richard W. McLaren, Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, United States v. Sealy, 388 
U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9) [hereinafter Sealy Transcript] (arguing that Simmons is ―an integrated 
firm; and that‘s one of the points we argue: Why should a licensee manufacturer under a 
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The fact that the Supreme Court treated the Sealy 
organizational structure as concerted action is not controversial. Still, 
the underlying facts can inform how lower courts should apply 
American Needle and Copperweld moving forward. First, the Sealy 
Court emphasized substance over form with respect to how to classify 
the restraint at issue.232 But the Court also touched on the importance 
of elevating substance over form and the antitrust implications of the 
structure of joint ventures when it characterized ―the use of Sealy, not 
as a separate entity, but as an instrumentality of the individual 
manufacturers.‖233 
In substance, the Sealy structure was the result of agreements 
among independent actors. The Court noted that ―Sealy agreed with 
each licensee not to license any other person to manufacture or sell in 
the designated area; and the licensee agreed not to manufacture or 
sell ‗Sealy products‘ outside the designated area.‖234 Sales outside of 
one‘s assigned territory were ―expressly forbidden by the contract 
between Sealy and the licensee.‖235 In seeking to avoid the per se rule, 
the Sealy defendants noted their ―contractual arrangement‖ should 
not be judged more harshly than ―structural arrangements,‖ like 
mergers or joint ventures.236 In making this argument, the defendants 
hit on an important point: they noted that they were in a contractual 
relationship. This suggests no single entity, because a single entity 
does not contract with itself. For example, a parent corporation and a 
wholly owned subsidiary do not make contracts with each other to 
carry out their plans. The parent tells the subsidiary what to do. The 
executives and other employees directly responsible for the 
subsidiary‘s day-to-day operations may make suggestions and provide 
input, but they have no power to pursue divergent policies in conflict 
 
trademark have to go out and compete with other people under that trademark when a brand 
owner, he doesn‘t?‖); id. (―And that‘s a basic issue in this case: Does a licensee trademark 
manufacturer have the same sort of rights as a trademark owner, or is he some sort of second-
class citizen where he has to compete against other people manufacturing under the same 
brand?‖). 
 232. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. at 352 (―If we look at substance rather than form, there is little 
room for debate. These must be classified as horizontal restraints.‖). 
 233. Id. at 356. 
 234. Id. at 352. 
 235. Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9), 
1966 WL 100610 [hereinafter Sealy Petitioner Brief].  
 236. United States v. Sealy, Inc., Motion to Affirm at 29, available at 21 ANTITRUST LAW: 
MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955 
Term – 1975 Term, at 815 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1979) (emphasis in 
original). 
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with parent‘s orders. In sum, if parties are contracting with each 
other, then they are separate entities capable of conspiring. 
It is appropriate that Sealy and its licensees were treated as 
independent entities because, in reality, Sealy employed the structure 
of a price-fixing cartel. With the competitor-licensees comprising the 
board of directors, Sealy established minimum prices, below which 
Sealy manufacturer-licensees could not charge. Following a trial, the 
district court found that the Sealy manufacturer-licensees had 
engaged in an illegal conspiracy to fix minimum retail prices on Sealy 
products and to police the prices so fixed.237 Sealy did not appeal the 
finding.238 
With respect to its territorial exclusivity policies, Sealy 
operated as a traditional cartel in some ways. For example, there were 
―numerous instances‖ in which licensees complained about price 
cutting by other licensees.239 Sealy enforced its territorial exclusivity 
scheme by requiring manufacturers to pay ten dollars for each Sealy 
item sold in another licensee‘s territory.240 The payments were made 
to Sealy, who forwarded them to the aggrieved licensee.241 This is 
reminiscent of the buyback policies employed by illegal price-fixing 
cartels.242 Beyond these classic cartel-enforcement devices, in 
mediating disputes among quarreling licensees, Sealy had no real 
authority beyond the power of persuasion.243 This stands in stark 
contrast to a true single entity structure where the central body 
controls the constituent parts. For example, a parent corporation does 
not fine its subsidiary or try to persuade it to take a particular action. 
The parent controls the subsidiary outright. 
Sealy argued that everyone involved in the Sealy structure 
shared the common interest of building the Sealy brand.244 It asserted 
that its licensees had to cooperate by focusing on their own territories 
and not freeriding on the investments in advertising made by other 
 
 237. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. at 351. 
 238. Id.; see also id. at 355–56 (1967) (―Appellee has not appealed the order of the District 
Court enjoining continuation of this price-fixing, but the existence and impact of the practice 
cannot be ignored in our appraisal of the territorial limitations. In the first place, this flagrant 
and pervasive price-fixing, in obvious violation of the law, was, as the trial court found, the 
activity of the ‗stockholder representatives' acting through and in collaboration with Sealy 
mechanisms.‖). 
 239. See Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 49. 
 240. Sealy Petitioner Brief, supra note 235, at 5.  
 241. Id. 
 242. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.  
 243. Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 7 (citing specific instances). 
 244. Sealy Respondent Brief, supra note 229, at 21. 
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Sealy licensees in their respective territories.245 Finally, Sealy argued 
that it had to coordinate these efforts from the center and impose 
them on the licensees.246 The Court found that none of rationales 
justified the agreements among Sealy and its licensees.247 By 
implication, Sealy‘s coordination arguments present no reason to 
suggest that Sealy and its licensees should constitute a single entity 
for antitrust purposes. 
A finding of conspiratorial capacity was obvious in Sealy 
because the individual bedding manufacturers were its only 
stockholders and completely controlled the corporation itself. About 
the best argument that the manufacturers could muster was that they 
wore two ―hats,‖ one when they acted in their own individual interests 
and another when they were acting on behalf of Sealy, Inc.248 The 
Court had little difficulty concluding that, even though Sealy assigned 
the exclusive territories at issue, these should be construed as the 
product of a horizontal agreement among Sealy‘s manufacturer 
directors. The government argued that ―the source of the territorial 
restriction is not an independent third party but the very sellers 
whom the restriction is designed to shield from competition.‖249 When 
control flows from the members to a central agent, concerted action is 
involved. 
Finally, the licensees‘ power to withdraw shows the presence of 
concerted action. The Sealy licensees could abandon their Sealy 
trademarks and manufacture mattresses under another label. They 
made long-term decisions about what was best for them, not 
necessarily what was best for Sealy.250 This is similar to firms in a 
cartel, which continually decide whether remaining in the cartel is in 
their own best interest.251 
All of the defendants in Sealy manufactured and sold products 
under a common trademark. Yet they were capable of conspiring. In 
some ways, this presents a stronger case for single entity status than 
 
 245. Id. at 21–22. 
 246. Id.  
 247. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 248. Id. at 353.  
 249. Sealy Petitioner Brief, supra note 235, at 22; id. at 24 (―Sealy . . . is not an independent 
firm responsive to interests other than those of its licensees. It is completely dominated by the 
licensees.‖). 
 250. See Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 4 (―[Licensees are] 
independent in the sense that they‘re not controlled by Sealy. And they‘re also independent in 
the sense that each one makes its own judgments as to how best exploit his particular market.‖) 
 251. See Leslie, Cartels, supra note 149, at 1638 (―Each firm makes an independent decision 
as to whether joining or remaining in a cartel is in the firm's own best interest.‖). 
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the NFL teams in American Needle, each of which possessed its own 
trademarks. It would be odd to say that firms sharing a single 
trademark were capable of conspiring while firms aggregating 
disparate trademarks were not. In terms of organizational structure, 
NFLP in American Needle operated as a centralized administrator in 
the same manner that Sealy did with its licensees and as the Central 
Selling Office did for the diamond cartel. In all of these situations, the 
presence of a central decisionmaking body does not render the overall 
enterprise a single entity for antitrust purposes. 
In addition to discussing Sealy, the American Needle Court 
opinion also cited United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.252 In Topco, 
several small- or medium-sized regional supermarket chains created 
and marketed the Topco brand canned goods.253 The Topco cooperative 
allocated exclusive territories to its members.254 The government 
challenged the association‘s exclusive territory policy as a per se 
illegal horizontal division of markets.255 The Court sided with the 
government, rejecting Topco‘s claim that the policy was a reasonable 
way to prevent freeriding and to build the Topco brand as a competitor 
to national store brands.256 American Needle cited Topco, along with 
Sealy, for the proposition that ―[a]greements made within a firm can 
constitute concerted action covered by § 1 when the parties to the 
agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself, and 
the intrafirm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing 
concerted action.‖257 It also highlighted Topco as an example of a 
―formally distinct business organization[ ] covered by § 1.‖258 As in 
Sealy, Topco‘s members owned all of its stock and controlled the board 
of directors.259 
Both the Topco and Sealy decisions have been rightfully 
criticized for applying an overly aggressive per se rule to restraints 
that were ancillary to legitimate, efficiency-enhancing joint ventures 
by firms that lacked significant market power.260 But that is not why 
 
 252. 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). 
 253. Id. at 596. 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id.  
 256. Id. at 612. 
 257. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010). 
 258. Id. at 2210. 
 259. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. at 598. 
 260. See 11 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 22, ¶ 1910c2 (criticizing the Topco 
Court‘s application of a per se rule against horizontal territorial restraints); 12 id. ¶ 2033b 
(criticizing the Court‘s classification of the restraints in Sealy and Topco as ―vertical‖); 13 id. ¶ 
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American Needle cited them. Both decisions also held that when a 
corporation imposes market limitations on the separate business of its 
shareholders who are in a position to compete with one another, the 
resulting restraints should be considered as a contract or combination 
rather than a unilateral act insofar as antitrust policy is concerned. 
The proper analysis in both cases would have been to apply Section 
One, but then to analyze the restraints at issue as ancillary to the 
activities of a joint venture. Both the Seventh and D.C. Circuits have 
taken this approach, and nothing in the American Needle opinion 
suggests that the Supreme Court would treat them any differently.261 
2. Dagher 
In Texaco v. Dagher,262 a private plaintiff challenged an 
agreement between Texaco and Shell Oil that created Equilon 
Enterprises, a joint venture to refine and sell gasoline in the western 
United States. The joint venture set a single price for gasoline, which 
continued to be sold under the Texaco and Shell Oil brands. The Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether this constituted per se illegal 
price fixing. 
While the case was limited to the reach of the per se rule, at 
times the opinion seemed to implicate the single entity question. For 
example, the Court framed the question as if Copperweld immunity 
were involved when it said that ―the pricing policy challenged here 
amounts to little more than price setting by a single entity—albeit 
within the context of a joint venture—and not a pricing agreement 
between competing entities with respect to their competing 
products.‖263 In describing the facts of the case and how antitrust law 
treats joint ventures, the Court explained that 
Texaco and Shell Oil shared in the profits of Equilon‘s activities in their role as 
investors, not competitors. When ―persons who would otherwise be competitors pool 
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit . . . such 
 
2134c (criticizing the use of the per se rule in Sealy and Topco); see also United States v. Sealy, 
Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 361 n.2 (Harlan J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of market power in Sealy) 
Topco, 405 U.S. at 600 (discussing same in Topco). 
 261. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(applying this approach to a nationwide moving company, which was owned by local moving 
companies and that imposed geographic restraints on the latter); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City 
Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying this approach to an ancillary market division 
agreement in a shopping mall). 
 262. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 263. Id. at 6. 
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joint ventures [are] regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the 
market.‖264 
Finally, in its holding the Court concluded that ―[a]s a single 
entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to 
determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the 
discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, 
unified price.‖265 All of these passages seem to suggest that the 
decisions made through the joint venture were those of a single entity 
and therefore beyond the reach of Section One. 
Despite these careless references to the single entity issue, the 
opinion ultimately treats Equilon‘s activities as the product of 
concerted action. First, the actual issue before the Court was when 
―the per se rule against price fixing applies to . . . the joint venture,‖266 
not whether Section One applied. Second, the Court held that 
―Equilon‘s price unification policy‖ could have been challenged 
pursuant to the rule of reason.267 
The Court was correct to treat the decisions of a joint venture 
as concerted action under Section One. Considering substance over 
form, a joint venture may legally be a distinct entity, but its actions 
are still subject to Section One scrutiny. The Court in American 
Needle held that it is not ―determinative that two legally distinct 
entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a 
structured joint venture.‖268 Texaco and Shell Oil‘s cooperative 
conduct through their joint venture must be subject to antitrust 
review or else illegal cartels could evade antitrust liability. 
The fact that a joint venture, like Equilon, serves a 
coordinating function does not remove its decisions from the reach of 
Section One. Antitrust legality will turn on what precisely the joint 
venture is coordinating. The Dagher Court presumed that Equilon was 
―a lawful joint venture,‖ suggesting that if it were ―a sham‖ then it 
could have been per se illegal.269 The legitimacy of Equilon‘s role as 
coordinator removed the joint venture from the per se category; it did 
not eliminate Section One scrutiny altogether. 
Finally, the members of the joint venture were not bound like a 
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. The only thing 
 
 264. Id. (quoting Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982)). 
 265. Id. at 7. 
 266. Id. at 5. 
 267. Id. at 7. 
 268. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010). 
 269. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 6. 
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that stopped Texaco and Shell Oil from competing was the agreement, 
but this does not make them incapable of conspiring.270 Texaco and 
Shell Oil could make their own pricing decisions on their branded 
gasoline; instead they have each decided to make the decisions 
through Equilon. Each could unilaterally exit the relationship. 
3. MasterCard and Visa 
Historically, the MasterCard and Visa bank credit card 
associations were organized as joint ventures among issuing banks.271 
For most banks the venture limited only a small portion of their 
activities, namely those involving the issuance of bank charge cards, 
and finding a single entity for the venture as a whole would have been 
absurd.272 Under this structure both the Visa and MasterCard joint 
ventures faced antitrust litigation aimed at a variety of practices, 
including an agreement under which member banks in each venture 
were forbidden from issuing competitors‘ cards, but with an exception 
for one another.273 Thus, for example, a bank issuing a Visa card was 
forbidden from issuing a Discover card but it could issue a 
MasterCard. This restraint on the issuing of others‘ cards was 
unsuccessfully challenged by Discover as a concerted refusal to deal.274 
Later litigation by the U.S. government proved more successful, 
however.275 
There have also been challenges to card issuer agreements 
setting the interchange and merchant acceptance fees that finance 
credit card transactions,276 and to the ―all cards‖ policy that requires 
 
 270. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214–15 (―Apart from their agreement to cooperate in 
exploiting those assets, including their decisions as NFLP, there would be nothing to prevent 
each of the teams from making its own market decisions relating to purchases of apparel and 
headwear, to the sale of such items, and to the granting of licenses to use its trademarks.‖). 
 271. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 272. Id. at 960–61. 
 273. See, e.g., id. (addressing whether Visa‘s refusal to admit Sears to its joint venture 
restrains trade in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act).  
 274. Id. (refusing to condemn exclusivity rules that enabled Visa and MasterCard to be 
issued by one another‘s banks but excluded rival cards such as Discover and American Express; 
to the extent it is relevant, one of the authors was consulted by the plaintiff).  
 275. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (condemning 
governance duality and exclusivity rules under rule of reason; to the extent it is relevant, one of 
the authors was consulted by the government); see also Discover Fin. Servs. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
No. 04–CV–7844, 2008 WL 4067445 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008) (denying summary judgment on 
claim by Discover, issuer of a rival card). 
 276. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 
1986) (applying rule of reason and refusing to condemn the fees). 
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those accepting Visa or MasterCard credit cards to also take that 
firm‘s debit cards.277 This Article does not consider the 
―reasonableness,‖ or antitrust legality, of any of these practices, but 
only whether they should be regarded as unilateral or 
conspiratorial.278 
Both MasterCard and Visa have substantially reorganized, 
changing their structure from a contractual joint venture agreement 
among independent, issuing member banks to a corporation in which 
these issuing banks are shareholders with very limited voting rights. 
For example, in the MasterCard venture, Class A shares, with full 
voting rights, were issued to the public in an IPO and are publicly 
traded.279 Banks that issue MasterCards are not permitted to hold 
Class A shares, at least for a defined time period.280 Issuing banks, by 
 
 277. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(describing settlement); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (certifying class action by large retailers). 
 278. On the legality question, see DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH 
PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the 
evolution of the credit card industry and defending the position of credit card associations 
against antitrust claims); Dennis W. Carlton & Alan Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit 
Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643 (1995) (discussing the potential for anticompetitive harm 
to result from collective action by members of credit card joint ventures); Adam J. Levitin, 
Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321 (2008) 
(arguing that merchant restraints should be banned as antitrust violations); Timothy J. 
Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of Two-Sided 
Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 517–18 (discussing the economics of two-sided markets); 
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of 
Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002) (analyzing the cooperative 
determination of the interchange fee by member banks in a payment card association); Todd J. 
Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 (2000) (dismissing the link between 
credit cards and the bankruptcy crisis); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Economics 
of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview (MIT Sloan, Working Paper No. 4548–05, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=744705 (analyzing whether policy makers should 
regulate interchange fees); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees 
and the Limits of Regulation (George Mason Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10–26, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624002 (arguing against 
interchange fee regulation); see also U. S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT ON CREDIT 
CARDS 44–45 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1045.pdf (discussing drawbacks 
of interchange fee regulation). 
 279. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 137, 145 (2007) (tracing development of MasterCard IPO); see also Adam J. Levitin, 
Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 425, 463–67 (2007). See generally Robert E. Litan & Alex J. Pollock, The Future of Charge 
Card Networks 6 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 06–03, 2006) 
(discussing the reorganization of MasterCard and Visa). MasterCard, Inc. trades on the New 
York Stock Exchange under the symbol ―MA,‖ and Visa, Inc. trades under the symbol ―V.‖ 
 280. Fleischer, supra note 279, at 145. 
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contrast, hold Class B shares, which have no voting rights.281 A third 
set of shares, Class M, are also held by member banks and have no 
voting rights with respect to routine business, although they do have 
veto power over major transactions that will affect the structure of the 
firm or its share classes.282 The Visa structure is roughly similar.283 
These seemingly odd schemes stand on its head the dual class 
voting structure found in some corporations. Typically when a 
corporation has two classes of voting shares the intent is to give 
insiders a greater amount of control than is manifested by their 
percentage ownership. For example, the Google, Inc. structure was 
designed to keep control of the corporation among its founders.284 Ford 
Motor Company‘s voting structure gives members of the Ford family 
approximately forty percent of the company‘s votes even though they 
own only six percent of its stock.285 In MasterCard, Inc. and Visa, Inc., 
by contrast, the member banks, while having only a minority stake, 
are also ongoing participants in the credit card business as 
independent firms, although they have effectively relinquished their 
voting rights. The likely explanation for this strategy is that the 
participants were seeking to limit antitrust exposure by ceding 
―control‖ to a single firm with diverse, inactive shareholders, as 
opposed to a joint venture in which decisions were made by active 
participants. The intended result would be that the IPOs would be 
treated as single entities for antitrust purposes rather than as 
collaborations involving agreements among rivals.286 
 
 281. Id.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Visa, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 26 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://investor.visa.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=215693&p=proxy (explaining that class B and C shares 
have no voting rights). In the Visa, Inc. IPO, Class B shareholders are financial institutions 
issuing Visa cards in the United States, while Class C shares are similar institutions in Canada. 
See GOLDMAN SACHS FIN. INST. GROUP, VISA IPO (2008), http://www.sharpeinvesting.com/ 
2008/01/visa-ipo-goldman-sachs-financial-institutions-group.html (discussing Visa‘s organization 
as an IPO). 
 284. In the Google, Inc. IPO, Class A shares were entitled to one vote each but class B shares 
received ten votes. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 789, 802–03 (2007) (describing Google structure as leaving outside investors largely 
powerless). 
 285. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 3047, 3066 (2009) (noting that as of 1998, the Ford family owned six percent of shares but 
controlled forty percent of votes). 
 286. Some authors have noted that this was very likely an intended result of the switch from 
a joint venture to a corporate structure. In addition to Fleischer, supra note 279, see Joshua D. 
Wright, The MasterCard IPO: MasterCard’s Single Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 225 
(2007) (expanding on Fleischer's analysis of the antitrust implications of MasterCard's new 
governance structure). 
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Whatever the economics, the legal implications of shifting the 
analysis from multilateral to unilateral conduct can be significant. 
Most importantly, the agreements among member banks in the old 
joint ventures not to permit issuance of rival cards such as Discover 
would be treated as a concerted refusal to deal, which could be 
unlawful per se if naked or, more likely, addressed under the rule of 
reason if found to be an ancillary restraint.287 By contrast, if a single 
firm issuing a MasterCard or Visa bank card refused to carry a rival‘s 
brands, the conduct would have to be analyzed as a unilateral refusal 
to sell a rival‘s goods, which entails virtual per se legality.288 Under 
the joint venture analysis, agreements on merchant acceptance and 
other transfer fees would be price agreements for that portion of the 
fee that the banks agreed to charge, and would generally be treated as 
ancillary to the joint venture‘s business and addressable under the 
rule of reason.289 Under single firm analysis, any fee on a transfer 
from one subsidiary bank to another would be a unilateral act. The 
agreed upon portion of any fee arrangement with merchants would be 
collaborative, but that agreement would be vertical rather than 
horizontal and almost certainly legal. The ―all-cards‖ policy, requiring 
merchants who wish to take a credit card to take that brand‘s debit 
cards as well, would be assessed under the law of tying arrangements, 
which are ordinarily unilaterally imposed.290 However, under the joint 
venture structure, they would have to be regarded as a collusive 
agreement among the upstream firms to engage in tying, which could 
invoke harsher antitrust treatment.291 Finally, within the joint 
venture structure the business relationship with the shareholder 
member banks is one of seller or buyer; that is, the IPOs treat the 
banks as their ―customers,‖ to whom they provide card issuance and 
management services. Formally these would count as purely vertical 
 
 287. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing 
the government‘s claim under a rule of reason); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958 
(10th Cir. 1994). 
 288. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004); see 
also 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, ¶¶ 772–73 (discussing unilateral refusals to deal 
and ―essential facility‖ doctrine). 
 289. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 
1986) (applying rule of reason analysis instead of per se analysis to Visa‘s conduct). 
 290. Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust’s 
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773 (1999) (arguing that most tying 
arrangements are essentially unilateral). 
 291. Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247 (2007) 
(advocating per se illegality for tying conspiracies). 
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relationships between the IPO as seller and each individual bank as 
purchaser. 
The problem can now be viewed this way: suppose a group of 
banks organize a corporation with two classes of shares. One class is 
publicly traded and has full voting rights. The other class has no 
voting rights with respect to day-to-day business, and its ownership is 
limited to the participating banks. Each of these banks is a separately 
owned firm, and the relationship between the banks and the central 
firm is that of shareholder and firm rather than parent and 
subsidiary. In this regime the directors and managers are answerable 
to the shareholders and they generally operate under the constraint 
that they must maximize the value of the firm; however, the value of 
the firm is largely a function of the aggregate value of the credit card 
business engaged in by the individual shareholder banks. 
This organization effectively uses the corporate form as a cartel 
or joint venture manager. Management‘s obligation to maximize firm 
value can be carried out by actions that increase profits because they 
are efficient and output expanding—that is, they might reduce costs, 
produce a superior product, or otherwise attract trade. Alternatively, 
they might increase profits because they reduce market output in a 
market where the firm has power, and thus enable higher prices or 
margins. If this were truly unilateral conduct, antitrust would largely 
be indifferent to the output reduction effects because a single firm is 
free to reduce output and raise prices as it pleases. 
Even though the banks are not voting decisionmakers in the 
firm, any rule that limits their individual behavior must be regarded 
as multilateral under the American Needle analysis. As a result, 
anticompetitive collusion would be reachable just as much as 
anticompetitive exclusion. Of course, the firm might engage in many 
other activities that have no impact at all on the member banks‘ 
separate business. For example, Visa, Inc. might decide to purchase a 
toaster manufacturer and operate it as a subsidiary, or it might decide 
to build a new office building for its corporate headquarters. As long 
as such a decision had no impact on how the individual shareholder 
banks conduct their business, it would be regarded as unilateral. By 
contrast, any decision that limited the ability of shareholders to 
compete in their separate business would be addressable under 
Section One of the Sherman Act. 
In sum, the MasterCard and Visa IPOs have the characteristics 
of centrally managed cartels. In substance, the central organization 
has the power to control the independent business of the individual 
issuing shareholders. The individual members have the ability to 
withdraw, which they can accomplish by selling their shares and 
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dropping the card. Further, it is unnecessary that the individual 
issuing banks coordinate their behavior with one another; the central 
organization solves that problem. Control runs from the organization 
to the individual members, limiting their independent business 
activity with respect to the issuance and management of bank cards. 
Legitimate reasons may have existed for the MasterCard and 
Visa IPOs. For example, a stronger central organization may have 
enhanced the cards‘ brand image as a safe and secure brand.292 
However, the unusual ―inverted‖ dual governance structure must have 
resulted from giving exaggerated importance to formal ―control‖ 
within collaborative associations. In any event, that decision was 
based on too subjective a view of control. Once the boards of the 
MasterCard and Visa IPOs were in place, their goal was to maximize 
firm profits, and they were as suited to accomplishing this task as any 
cartel ringleader, whether or not a functioning member of the cartel 
itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court‘s opinion in American Needle provides an 
opportunity to examine the connection between cartel theory and the 
single entity question in antitrust. Many successful cartels function by 
taking control away from individual members and giving it to a single 
organization. A business organization such as a corporation becomes 
an ideal vehicle for cartel management. Understanding how cartels 
actually operate can help courts distinguish between a legitimate 
single entity and a centralized cartel structure subject to Section One 
liability. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the rule of 
reason remains for joint ventures among separate business entities 
that have significant integrative potential. While both unilateral 
conduct and ancillary collaborative conduct are treated under the rule 
of reason, however, the conduct standard differs. Under Section Two of 
the Sherman Act, a single firm is responsible only for its unreasonably 
exclusionary practices directed against rivals or potential rivals. By 
contrast, under Section One, a cartel or joint venture is answerable in 
antitrust when its members unreasonably reduce output and increase 
price, whether or not there is actionable exclusionary conduct. 
As the history of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine 
indicates, that doctrine was developed in a milieu in which per se 
 
 292. See Fleischer, supra note 279 (making this argument about the MasterCard IPO). 
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rules were much more aggressive and of significantly broader scope 
than they are today. Too broad a finding of ―conspiracy‖ inside a 
traditional business firm could mean that perfectly benign business 
behavior might become an antitrust violation. But the last twenty-five 
years has seen a considerable contraction of per se rules and broad 
expansion of the rule of reason. In cases such as American Needle, 
Topco, and Seely, which involve both corporate restraints imposed on 
independent firms and joint ventures with significant integrative 
potential, the soundest approach is to view them as involving both 
collaborative activity and ancillary restraints—situations for which 
antitrust‘s rule of reason is appropriate. Courts should evaluate the 
anticompetitive effects of resulting restraints, not immunize them 
from antitrust liability through the intraenterprise conspiracy 
doctrine. 
 
